UK Jet Fuel & Road Fuel — 2026 Three-Scenario Forecast
UK jet-fuel days-of-cover from March through year-end against the IEA 23-day operational threshold, with three scenarios. Threshold breach is the base case (~50%), a broader retail crack the main tail (~40%), and network holds a minority path (~10%). Prose refreshed 12 October (Hormuz Day 226); the chart is unchanged because no new cover data has been published since 1 July.
Weights held; chart not redrawn. GEF reviewed this forecast on 26 and 29 September and again on 5 and 6 October. No confirmed UK jet-fuel cover figure has been published since 1 July, so the chart is left as drawn on 8 September rather than extended with new estimates. The weights (threshold breach ~50%, broader retail crack ~40%, network holds ~10%) are held. What has changed since 17 September: the Saudi East–West Petroline, the main Hormuz bypass feeding the Red Sea route Europe relies on, restarted on 22 September after an 11-day halt and carried about 3.5m b/d on 28 September, with Yanbu loading again at roughly half of pre-attack rates; Iran tabled a seven-day reopening plan on 25 September, which Washington rejected on 26 September before indirect talks resumed through Qatar on 28 September without a deal. Against that, Russian diesel refining remains cut back after Ukrainian strikes, and UK diesel passed £2 a litre for the first time at a record 200.01p on 2 October.
A test the base case now faces. Scenario 2 modelled a cover trough of about 14 days in late September / early October, with NOTAMs at secondary airports. As of 5 October no UK airport fuel NOTAM and no fuel-attributable cancellations have been found in GEF’s review. That is not proof cover is healthy, because the underlying data is not published, but it is evidence against the trough arriving on schedule. If there are still no NOTAMs or confirmed shortfalls by mid-October, GEF will move weight from Scenario 2 toward Scenario 1. The structural exposure is unchanged and mapped on the UK tracker: four operating refineries remain after Grangemouth converted to an import terminal and Lindsey ceased refining in 2025.
UK jet-fuel days-of-cover in 2026: observed to July 1 with an estimated line to September 8, plus three forecasts to year-end (chart as drawn 8 September)
Y-axis is days of jet-fuel inventory cover at UK aggregate level. The 23-day line is the IEA’s operational threshold — below it, refuelling reliability degrades and physical airport shortages start. The solid line is observed through 1 July, the last confirmed print; the continuation to 8 September is a GEF estimate, shown lighter to mark that distinction. The chart has not been extended past 8 September because no new cover data exists, and GEF does not redraw charts from estimates alone. The backdrop since then: Brent settled $104.32 on Friday 25 September, down from mid-September highs above $105; the Petroline bypass restarted on 22 September; and on 26 September GEF’s AIS reading still showed no satellite-AIS tanker signal inside Hormuz for a fourth consecutive morning.
One data point = the estimated UK aggregate jet-fuel inventory expressed as days of forward demand cover, drawing on IATA Jet Fuel Monitor (weekly), ACI Europe stock estimates, DfT operational reporting and Cirium flight-schedule data. Individual airports vary; major hubs (LHR, LGW, MAN) sit modestly above the aggregate and secondary fields modestly below. As of 26 September no UK airport fuel NOTAM or fuel-attributable cancellation has been found.
Where each metric lands by December 31, 2026
Today (26 Sep review) — estimate carried, no confirmed print since 1 Jul
~23.8 days
Last CONFIRMED print: ~26.5 days (1 July). The ~23.8-day figure is GEF’s 8 September ESTIMATE, carried unchanged at the 17 and 26 September reviews because no new IATA, DfT or ACI figure has been published. Developments since pull both ways. In the UK’s favour: the Saudi East–West Petroline restarted on 22 September and is building toward 4m b/d, reopening the Red Sea route Europe uses for distillate and jet; no UK airport fuel NOTAM has appeared. Against: Yanbu loadings had not resumed as of 25 September, Houthi missiles were aimed at Yanbu and Taif on 24 September (intercepted), and Russian diesel refining remains cut after Ukrainian strikes, draining the same middle-distillate pool jet competes for. GEF will replace the estimate the moment a confirmed print is published rather than drift it to look current.
Scenario 1 — Network holds
~29 days
MINORITY PATH (~10%). Requires a verified Hormuz reopening — for example an agreed version of Iran’s 25 September seven-day plan — with tanker traffic actually resuming. Cover rebuilds to about 29 days by December, still below the 35-day norm.
Scenario 2 — Threshold breach
~20 days
BASE CASE (~50%). The strait stays shut without a decisive escalation. Cover stays near or below 23 days through much of H2, with a modelled trough near 14 days in late September, recovering only to ~20 days by December. As of 26 September the trough’s observable signals (NOTAMs, cancellations) have not appeared; see the review note above.
Scenario 3 — Broader retail crack
~11 days
TAIL (~40%). A further major shock — a strike that takes the Petroline or Yanbu offline again, or a successful attack on Red Sea shipping — pushes jet cover into physical-shortage territory, troughing near 8 days. Cancellations 10–15%, and road-fuel availability slips, with diesel already near its 199.09p record.
Background reference
5-yr norm: 35 days IEA threshold: 23 days
5-yr seasonal norm for UK jet-fuel cover sits around 35 days. The IEA 23-day threshold is the operational trigger for physical airport shortages (per ACI Europe's Apr 9 letter to the EU Transport Commissioner).
Crude and pump backdrop, 5 Oct
Brent $100.32 Mon 5 Oct settle · UK diesel £2 breach at 200.01p (RAC, 2 Oct)
Brent settled $100.32 on Monday 5 October (WTI $89.43), after a round-trip week — a $4.28 Thursday rally on China’s fuel-export suspension reversed by the G7 100 Mbbl diesel+crude release (Friday 2 Oct settle $102.25). UK diesel passed £2 a litre for the first time: 200.01p (RAC, 2 October) above the 199.09p June 2022 record; petrol 174.71p. The RAC says only a sustained lower oil price over several weeks will bring pump prices down.
MarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec
Jet-fuel days-of-cover — observed
Scenario 1: Network holds
Scenario 2: Threshold breach
Scenario 3: Broader retail crack
Forecast model · GEF supply-chain analysis · observed Mar–1 Jul from IATA Jet Fuel Monitor, ACI Europe estimates, DfT operational reporting, Cirium flight data; 1 Jul–8 Sep estimated (no fresher confirmed print) · scenarios are illustrative, not guarantees · chart drawn 8 Sep; prose reviewed 26 Sep with weights heldglobal-energy-flow.com · September 26, 2026
Reading the chart. The solid line is observed UK aggregate jet-fuel days-of-cover from 1 March, when the Hormuz closure began feeding through European refining margins, to 1 July, the last confirmed IATA/DfT print. Cover drifted from about 32 days in early March to 23–24 days by mid-June, then rebuilt to about 26.5 days by 1 July — above the IEA’s 23-day threshold (the red line). The lighter continuation to 8 September is a GEF estimate, easing to about 23.8 days to reflect the early-September escalation and the 7 September strike on Aramco’s Jazan refinery. From there the paths diverge: green if Hormuz verifiably reopens (Scenario 1), amber if the standoff persists (Scenario 2, the base case), red if a further major shock cracks aviation supply and spreads to road fuel (Scenario 3).
Scenario 1Network holds — a minority path (~10%). This needs a verified reopening of Hormuz, not a plan on paper. Iran’s 25 September seven-day proposal would lift the blockade and sanctions first and reopen the strait on day seven; Washington rejected it on 26 September, and indirect talks that resumed through Qatar on 28 September have produced no deal. The operational record supports this path more than the diplomacy does: the DfT’s last schedule analysis (to 14 June) showed under 1% of flights cancelled, carriers hedged heavily, and no UK airport fuel NOTAM has appeared at any point. If this path holds, cover rebuilds to about 29 days by December, still below the 35-day norm.
Scenario 2Threshold breach — the base case (~50%). The strait stays shut without a decisive escalation, which is the situation on Day 229. UK aviation depends heavily on imported refined product — Britain refines a smaller share of its own jet fuel than France or Germany — so it remains exposed. In this path aggregate cover stays near or below 23 days through much of the second half, troughs at about 14 days in late September, and recovers only to about 20 days by December. NOTAMs become likely at secondary airports during the trough and cancellations climb toward 6–9%. As of 12 October GEF found no UK airport fuel NOTAM and no fuel-driven UK cancellations, so those signals have not appeared, which is why this scenario is under review.
Scenario 3Broader retail crack — the main tail (~40%). A further major shock — the Petroline or Yanbu taken offline again, a successful Houthi strike on Red Sea shipping, or the diplomatic track collapsing — degrades UK jet cover faster than in Scenario 2, troughing near 8 days, below ACI Europe’s April warning of 8–10 days at the worst-affected hubs. Cancellations reach 10–15% and multiple airports issue NOTAMs. The same conditions reach road fuel: with diesel already at a record 200.01p above £2/litre, the first intermittent station outages become plausible. By December, jet cover recovers only to about 11 days.
UK factorWhy the UK is different from the EU forecast. The EU forecast on this site tracks petrol and diesel availability as a share of normal supply, because the EU’s stress is broad and road-fuel-led. The UK’s is narrower and aviation-led, with road fuel showing stress through price rather than availability: diesel is within 2p of its all-time record while the government maintains there are no immediate supply issues. UK Day +N — days past Ryanair CEO Michael O’Leary’s 4 May cliff edge — stands at Day +145 on 26 September. A growing count does not by itself show the network is safe; the Hormuz and Red Sea situation is what will move this forecast, and GEF treats each diplomatic development as unconfirmed until it shows up in ship movements.
MethodThis is a scenario forecast, not a prediction. The observed March–1 July line is built from IATA Jet Fuel Monitor weekly prints, ACI Europe stock estimates, DfT schedule-cancellation reporting and Cirium airport-level data; the 1 July–8 September extension is a GEF estimate, labelled as such throughout. The branches to December are illustrative paths. Weights were set on 8 September and held at the 26 September review. The outcome depends on whether Hormuz reopens in practice, whether Red Sea routes stay open, North Atlantic refinery uptime and winter demand. Sources: IEA Oil Market Report; IATA Jet Fuel Monitor; ACI Europe letter to the EU Transport Commissioner (9 April); UK Department for Transport schedule analysis (to 14 June); RAC Foresight Data (23 September); DESNZ weekly road fuel prices (21 September); Reuters and Zawya on the Petroline restart and Yanbu loadings (22–25 September); reporting on Iran’s seven-day plan (25 September); GEF’s own AIS chokepoint reading (26 September). Per-pin detail and the live UK aviation watchlist at global-energy-flow.com/shortages/united-kingdom/.