Shortages European Union 2026 Forecast

EU Petrol & Diesel Availability — 2026 Three-Scenario Forecast

Observed January to 14 July, the last EU-wide road-fuel availability read (no fresher print has been published, so GEF holds the line flat rather than extrapolating), plus three scenarios to year-end. Sustained standoff is the base case, with de-escalation and escalation as the two tails. As of the last confirmed read: diesel ~86%, petrol ~89% of normal supply. Text reviewed 5 October (Hormuz Day 219); chart drawn 2 September.

Forecast Reviewed September 26, 2026

EU live status Disruption map By country Timeline 2026 Forecast

Correction and update, 22 September 2026

Correction to the 20 September note below. That note attributed the French shortage to logistics friction including low water on the Rhine, and concluded that the buffer absorbing this war had thinned far enough for ordinary friction to empty pumps in a G7 economy. That conclusion was wrong and is withdrawn.

Fuller departmental data published on 21 September shows Paris as the worst-affected department at 31.9%, ahead of Bas-Rhin at 25.3% and Indre-et-Loire at 24.7%. Paris is not Rhine-fed, and that breaks the logistics reading: the concentration is by brand, not geography. Between 86% and 91% of all ruptures sit inside the 3,600-station TotalEnergies network, which has held pump prices at €1.99/litre for petrol and €2.25 for diesel since 22 July while the market moved to €2.18 and €2.42. A 17–19 cent discount concentrates demand faster than road tankers can cycle. Economy Minister Roland Lescure describes it as a commercial problem rather than a national logistics failure; strategic reserves are full and refineries run at maximum capacity.

The situation is nonetheless worsening. The daily series runs 11% of stations out of stock on 18 September, 13% on the 19th, 15% on the 20th and 16.5–17% on Monday the 21st, of which 11% are completely dry — roughly 2,500 of France’s 9,900 stations. By grade: SP95 23.7%, SP98 19%, and gazole 12.5%, against just 2% on 11 September — the shortage is spreading into diesel.

What this means for the EU-wide forecast. Less than the 20 September note implied. An administered price below the clearing price is a distribution failure inside one retail network, not evidence that European supply is failing; it does not by itself justify revising the availability scenarios on this page. The war link survives one step further back — Total capped prices because the war pushed the French market to €2.18 and €2.42, and there is no gap to cap in a €1.70 market — but that is a statement about price levels, which this page already tracks, rather than about barrels failing to arrive.

Update, 20 September 2026

France is the first major Western European market in this cycle to register station-level physical unavailability at scale, and it changes what this page can say. At 09:00 on Friday 18 September, 11% of French service stations were out of stock — roughly one in nine — and President Macron convened an emergency meeting at the Élysée the same day. This page has held its observed EU-wide availability series flat since 14 July for want of a fresher print; that caveat stands, because a national French reading is not an EU-wide one. But it is the first hard availability number from a large member state since the series stalled, and it points the wrong way.

It is a deterioration, not the tail of the earlier episode. The Sep 6–11 wave peaked with SP95 21% of stations dry, SP98 12%, E10 10% and gazole just 2%, ran at 6–7% of stations missing at least one grade, and was already easing by the evening of 8 September. It has since roughly doubled. The regional gradient runs inland and east rather than port-first — Grand Est 16%, Centre-Val de Loire 14%, Occitanie 14%, against Île-de-France at 7% — which is not the shape a seaborne-supply failure produces. Reporting attributes it to logistics friction rather than a national supply failure, including low water on the Rhine constraining barge movements into eastern France. Correction, 22 September: that attribution does not hold. Departmental data showed Paris, which is not Rhine-fed, worst affected at 31.9%, and 86–91% of outages sit in the TotalEnergies network, which has capped prices below market since 22 July. The shortage is a price-cap distortion, not a logistics failure.

Why it matters for the rest of the forecast. The skew is petrol-led, which runs against the global pattern where distillate is the tight barrel. France holds deep strategic stocks and has no import dependence comparable to the emerging-market cases on the shortages map. Physical unavailability at one station in nine there suggests the buffer absorbing this war has thinned far enough that ordinary logistics friction is now sufficient to empty pumps in a G7 economy — which is a lower bar than any scenario on this page assumed. (Withdrawn 22 September: the cause turned out to be a price cap concentrating demand on one retail network, not thin buffers; see the correction above.) Pump prices on 18 September: gazole €2.378/litre, SP95-E10 €2.160/litre. Government response: a new support scheme for vulnerable workers from 1 October, high-mileage driver assistance extended beyond 30 September, and a proposed VAT cut from 20% to 5.5% rejected.

On the gas side (updated 28 September): EU storage stood at 70.87% on GEF’s direct GIE read for gas day 26 September, refilling at about +0.20 points a day against roughly +0.25 needed for the relaxed 80% target — borderline, with Germany at 57.02%.

Currency note, 5 October 2026

The observed series still ends 14 July: no fresher EU-wide road-fuel availability print has been published, and GEF holds it flat rather than extrapolating. Scenario weights are held (de-escalation ~25%, sustained standoff ~50%, escalation ~25%). The evidence since the chart was drawn pulls both ways. For the base case: Hormuz is still CRITICAL on Day 219 after four tanker strikes on 1-4 October; Trump rejected a renewed Iranian proposal around 1 October and US officials signal airstrikes probable after the November midterms; and European jet fuel averaged about $207.57/bbl (IATA, week to 18 Sep), up 27.8% on the month (Euronews, 23 September), which competes with diesel for refinery output. Against a worse outcome: Lloyd’s List reports Red Sea tanker loadings rising as Aramco ramps pipeline contingency (last confirmed throughput ~3.5m b/d on 28 September), the G7 released 100 million barrels of diesel and crude through the IEA on 2 October with the first 20 days front-loaded as diesel, about 900,000 tonnes of Asian jet fuel are heading to Europe, and France’s forecourt outages are a price-cap distortion in one retail network rather than missing barrels.

The gas side is borderline: EU storage was 70.87% on GEF’s direct GIE read for gas day 26 September, refilling at about +0.20 points a day against roughly +0.25 needed for the relaxed 80% target, with Germany at 57.02% and the Netherlands at 56.53%. Refined products remain the structural weak point: Russian diesel refining is still cut after Ukrainian strikes (Reuters, 15 September), and winter heating from October competes with transport diesel. Forecourt availability outside France remains the least stressed part of the European picture.

European petrol & diesel availability in 2026: observed to July 14 (held flat since), plus three forecasts to year-end

Index where 100% = normal pre-crisis road-fuel supply (early Feb 2026). Below ~90% = visible tightness and price-cap measures; below ~80% = rationing-type controls spread. Solid lines are observed to 14 July and held flat to 2 September, when the chart was drawn and the dashed scenarios begin; no fresh EU-wide road-fuel print has landed since. All three scenarios include the EU’s June 17 ban on Russian short-term pipeline gas contracts, which weighs on diesel via gas-to-power substitution.

One data point = the estimated share of normal petrol/diesel volume reaching European forecourts, aggregated across EU member states + UK from confirmed national measures (rationing, price caps, refinery feedstock cuts) and import-flow data. Hungary's foreign-plate price cap was abolished Jun 26, 2026 after market prices fell below the regulated level — see the EU status page. Slovenia's road-fuel rationing decree remains removed from GEF's tracker (no fresh evidence of re-activation).

Where each fuel lands by December 31, 2026 (de-escalation → base case → escalation tail)

Last observed (14 Jul) — held flat, reviewed 26 Sep

86–89%

Diesel ~86% · petrol ~89% of normal supply at the last EU-wide read on 14 July. No newer EU-wide print exists, so the level is carried, not re-estimated. The one large national reading since is France, where the government counted 12% of stations short of at least one fuel on 4 October, up from a dip to 9% on 2 October and 14% on 28 September; GEF does not fold it into the EU index because it is a price-cap distortion in one network, not an EU-wide supply loss. Brent settled $102.25 on 2 October after a round-trip week with a $4.28 Thursday rally reversed by the G7 100 Mbbl release.

Scenario 1 — De-escalation

92–96%

OPTIMISTIC CASE (~25%, demoted from the prior 65% base case). The US blockade lifts, the transit toll is dropped, Brent eases back. Supply recovers as Gulf cargoes arrive — petrol ~96%, diesel ~92% by December. Held just below 100% by the permanent Russian pipeline-gas loss (June 17 ban).

Scenario 2 — Sustained standoff

75–82%

BASE CASE (~50%). Brief pauses keep breaking into fresh kinetic events — most recently the September naval exchanges and the drone strikes that halted the Saudi East–West pipeline for 11 days — without a decisive resolution either way; Gulf cargoes keep arriving but at reduced, costlier volumes. Petrol drifts to ~82%, diesel to ~75% by December — entering the rationing-risk zone. Russia's ongoing ban on diesel exports (its own refining capacity still impaired from Ukrainian drone strikes) continues tightening the global pool Europe competes in for non-Russian barrels.

Scenario 3 — Escalation tail

48–58%

TAIL RISK (~25%, up from 10%). A further kinetic cycle opens a new front (Bab el-Mandeb, or a Kharg Island strike) and Russia redirects volumes to Asia rather than complying with the June 17 ban. Diesel ~48% · petrol ~58% by December — worse than the prior model's 52%/61%, reflecting the demonstrated pattern of repeated re-escalation.

JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec

Petrol — observed

Diesel — observed

Scenario 1: De-escalation (~25%)

Scenario 2: Sustained standoff — base case (~50%)

Scenario 3: Escalation tail (~25%)

Forecast model · GEF supply-chain analysis · observed Jan–14 Jul from confirmed national measures + import-flow data, held flat to 2 Sep · scenarios are illustrative, not guarantees · chart drawn 2 Sep; text and weights reviewed 26 Sep global-energy-flow.com · September 26, 2026

Current state, 5 October 2026. Europe’s pressure points are gas storage, diesel and one retail network in France. EU gas storage stood at 70.87% on GEF’s direct GIE read for gas day 26 September (801.99 TWh), refilling at about +0.20 points a day — borderline for the relaxed 80% November target. France’s forecourt shortage peaked near 17% of stations on 21 September; the government counted 12% of stations short of at least one fuel on 4 October (up from a dip to 9% on 2 October and 14% on 28 September), driven by a price cap in the TotalEnergies network rather than a missing barrel. On the sea routes, Hormuz remains CRITICAL on Day 219 after four tanker strikes between 1 and 4 October (Kazimah III, Uhud, Lipsi, drone-funnel strike); Trump rejected a renewed Iranian proposal around 1 October with airstrikes signalled after the November midterms; the Saudi bypass pipeline is in sustained restart (Yanbu loading at ~half of pre-attack rates); the G7 released 100 Mbbl of diesel and crude through the IEA on 2 October. The observed road-fuel availability series on this page still ends 14 July; GEF holds it flat rather than extrapolating.

Reading the chart. The two solid lines show what has actually happened to European petrol and diesel availability since January: both sat at full pre-crisis supply until the Strait of Hormuz closed on February 28, then slipped through spring as Hungary introduced a price cap (Mar 9) and other national measures compounded the pressure. Availability improved through late June as the Jun 17 Islamabad Memorandum and Jun 30 Doha coordination talks unwound the crude premium — reaching petrol 90%/diesel 88% by July 1 — but the MoU broke down the week of July 7: three vessels were struck near Oman, the US struck Iran three consecutive nights, and by July 14 the US Navy had reimposed its Hormuz blockade and announced a new 20% transit toll. Availability has dipped again, to petrol 89%/diesel 86% as of July 14. GEF has revised the three dashed scenarios accordingly: a sustained standoff is now the base case rather than continued recovery, and the escalation tail has both grown in probability and deepened in severity.

Scenario 1De-escalation — the optimistic case (~25%, demoted from the prior 65% base case). The June 17 Islamabad Memorandum, which broke down the week of July 7, is renegotiated or a new arrangement takes hold; the US Navy stands down its reimposed blockade; the 20% transit toll is dropped or unenforced. Availability recovers as Gulf cargoes arrive — Gulf cargoes take roughly two months to reach European refineries and forecourts, August jet-fuel demand is about 40% higher than March, and the EU's June 17 ban on short-term Russian pipeline gas contracts (in force) weighs on diesel via gas-to-power substitution regardless. By December, petrol reaches ~96% and diesel ~92% of normal. The gap from a clean 100% is the permanent Russian pipeline-gas loss, plus the reality that ADNOC's chief executive has said full Middle East flow recovery is unlikely before late 2027. This was the base case as of the Jul 1 model; the events of Jul 7-14 have moved it to the optimistic tail.

Scenario 2Sustained standoff — the NEW BASE CASE (~50%, up from 30% in the prior model). The pattern of the last two weeks continues: intermittent strikes, a US blockade that raises costs and friction without fully stopping flow, and a toll dispute that neither side backs down from. Gulf cargoes keep arriving but at reduced, costlier volumes; August jet-fuel demand (about 40% higher than March) competes with road-fuel diesel for the same constrained refinery capacity; the EU's June 17 ban on short-term Russian pipeline gas contracts weighs on diesel throughout. Inventory cover stays thin — commercial cover already measured in weeks, ARA distillate stocks below the five-year average — and winter heating from October competes directly with transport diesel. By December, petrol drifts to ~82% and diesel to ~75% of normal, entering the rationing-risk zone for the first time on this chart's base case.

Scenario 3Escalation tail — a further kinetic cycle opens a new front (~25%, up from 10%). A Bab el-Mandeb front opens alongside Hormuz, or a strike lands on Kharg Island itself (ORF Middle East estimates a simultaneous Hormuz + Bab el-Mandeb disruption puts ~25% of global oil and gas and ~30% of container shipping at risk, ~$10B/day in trade); Cape of Good Hope reroutes add 12–15 days and ~$1M per voyage. On top of that, Moscow redirects volumes rather than complying with the EU's June 17 ban, suspending TurkStream and Tengiz-Novorossiysk flows (officially blamed on Ukrainian drone damage) and redirecting remaining oil and product volumes to higher-paying Asian buyers. Diesel degrades faster than petrol because it is more exposed to both the lost Gulf and Russian flows and the heating-season pull. By December, diesel falls to ~48% and petrol to ~58% of normal — worse than the prior model's 52%/61%, reflecting the demonstrated pattern of repeated re-escalation through 2026 — the level at which rationing-type controls spread well beyond Hungary into a wider cluster of member states.

Russia factorWhy Russia bends all three lines. Russia is now a smaller direct supplier to Europe than before 2022 — Russian crude is already under 3% of EU oil imports and pipeline gas/LNG down to roughly 13% — so this is not a 2022-style dependency shock. But two things still move the curves: first, the EU's own ban on Russian short-term pipeline gas contracts took effect June 17, 2026 — removing residual supply in all three scenarios and tightening diesel through gas-to-power substitution; second, Moscow retains the option to pre-empt further by suspending TurkStream and Tengiz-Novorossiysk (which would likely be blamed on Ukrainian drone damage) and redirecting remaining oil and product volumes to higher-paying Asian buyers, which would pull that loss forward and deepen the downside in Scenario 3. The effect is diesel-weighted — petrol is only lightly exposed to the gas bans directly — and it is the reason even the de-escalation scenario settles near 92–96% rather than a clean 100%.

MethodThis is a scenario forecast, not a prediction. The observed Jan–Jul 14 line is built from confirmed government measures and import-flow data; the Jul–Dec branches are illustrative model paths, REBUILT from scratch on Jul 14 after the Jun 17 MoU broke down, and are not guarantees. The real outcome will depend on whether the US blockade and 20% transit toll persist, escalate further (a Bab el-Mandeb front, a Kharg Island strike), or de-escalate; winter severity; refinery uptime; and whether Russia redirects volumes rather than complying with the EU's import bans. Sources: GIE AGSI+, IEA Oil Market Report, Cirium/ICIS Europe jet deficit estimates, ADNOC, ORF Middle East (dual-chokepoint impact), EU REPowerEU phase-out regulation (Russian gas ban dates), Council of the EU, national energy regulators and government decrees, CNBC/CNN/Al Jazeera/Bloomberg (Jul 13 Brent settle $83.30, blockade reinstatement, transit toll), Kpler/Windward (Hormuz transit data). Per-disruption detail and the live EU shortage map at global-energy-flow.com/shortages/eu/.

Related: the US gas-price + SPR forecast tracks AAA pump price alongside the Strategic Petroleum Reserve drawdown (three scenarios, $3.80–$6.10 by year-end); the UK jet-fuel three-scenario forecast tracks British aviation against the IEA 23-day threshold; the Australia petrol & diesel forecast pivots on the June 30 fuel-excise cliff and the Geelong refinery restart (two scenarios). See also the EU gas storage trajectory (the gas-side companion to this road-fuel forecast), the live storage tracker, and gas pipeline flows.