EU Petrol & Diesel Availability — 2026 Two-Scenario Forecast

Reading the chart. The two solid lines show what has actually happened to European petrol and diesel availability since January: both sat at full pre-crisis supply until the Strait of Hormuz closed on February 28, then slipped through spring as Hungary introduced a price cap (Mar 9) and other national measures compounded the pressure. By July 1, diesel sits near 88% and petrol near 90% of normal — improving as the Jun 17 Islamabad Memorandum and Jun 30 Doha coordination talks unwind the crude premium, Hungary's cap dissolves (market prices below cap level), and Brent closed Q2 at ~$73 (worst quarterly decline since 2020). The two dashed pairs reflect the current outlook: continued recovery is the base case and full re-escalation the low-probability tail.

Scenario 1Continued recovery — the base case (~65%). The Jun 17 Islamabad Memorandum and Jun 30 Doha coordination talks have both held, surviving a Jun 25-28 kinetic test without reversing; this remains the active path. Availability dips shallowly into midsummer — Gulf cargoes take roughly two months to reach European refineries and forecourts, August jet-fuel demand is about 40% higher than March, and the EU's June 17 ban on short-term Russian pipeline gas contracts (in force) weighs on diesel via gas-to-power substitution — before recovering from September as cargoes arrive. By December, petrol reaches ~96% and diesel ~92% of normal. The gap from a clean 100% is the permanent Russian pipeline-gas loss, plus the reality that ADNOC's chief executive has said full Middle East flow recovery is unlikely before late 2027. The key variable on this path is whether Iran's post-MoU hardening — the transit-fee reservation and co-regulation demands — eventually derails the recovery or is absorbed without a fresh disruption.

Scenario 2Re-escalation tail — dual chokepoint + Russia redirection (~10%). The low-probability path: a fresh kinetic cycle beyond the scale of the Jun 25-28 exchange resumes, the Doha coordination mechanism fails to contain it, and Iran extends closure to Bab el-Mandeb (ORF Middle East estimates a simultaneous Hormuz + Bab el-Mandeb disruption puts ~25% of global oil and gas and ~30% of container shipping at risk, ~$10B/day in trade); Cape of Good Hope reroutes add 12–15 days and ~$1M per voyage. On top of that, Moscow redirects volumes rather than complying with the EU's June 17 ban, suspending TurkStream and Tengiz-Novorossiysk flows (officially blamed on Ukrainian drone damage) and redirecting remaining oil and product volumes to higher-paying Asian buyers. Inventory depletion compounds: commercial cover already thin, ARA distillate stocks below the five-year average, and winter heating from October competes directly with transport diesel. Diesel degrades faster than petrol because it is more exposed to both the lost Gulf and Russian flows and the heating-season pull. By December, diesel falls to ~52% and petrol to ~61% of normal — the level at which rationing-type controls spread well beyond Hungary into a wider cluster of member states.

Russia factorWhy Russia bends both lines. Russia is now a smaller direct supplier to Europe than before 2022 — Russian crude is already under 3% of EU oil imports and pipeline gas/LNG down to roughly 13% — so this is not a 2022-style dependency shock. But two things still move the curves: first, the EU's own ban on Russian short-term pipeline gas contracts took effect June 17, 2026 — removing residual supply in both scenarios and tightening diesel through gas-to-power substitution; second, Moscow retains the option to pre-empt further by suspending TurkStream and Tengiz-Novorossiysk (which would likely be blamed on Ukrainian drone damage) and redirecting remaining oil and product volumes to higher-paying Asian buyers, which would pull that loss forward and deepen the downside in Scenario 2. The effect is diesel-weighted — petrol is only lightly exposed to the gas bans directly — and it is the reason Scenario 1 settles near 88–96% rather than a clean 100%.

MethodThis is a scenario forecast, not a prediction. The observed Jan–Jul line is built from confirmed government measures and import-flow data; the Jul–Dec branches are illustrative model paths, not guarantees, and the real outcome will depend on whether the Doha coordination mechanism holds under further kinetic tests, winter severity, refinery uptime, whether Iran follows through on its Bab el-Mandeb extension threat, and whether Russia redirects volumes rather than complying with the EU's import bans. Sources: GIE AGSI+, IEA Oil Market Report, Cirium/ICIS Europe jet deficit estimates, ADNOC, ORF Middle East (dual-chokepoint impact), EU REPowerEU phase-out regulation (Russian gas ban dates), Council of the EU, national energy regulators and government decrees, TradingEconomics/Investing.com (Brent Q2 close ~$73, worst quarterly decline since 2020). Per-disruption detail and the live EU shortage map at global-energy-flow.com/shortages/eu/.