Live Tanker Traffic — Global AIS Map

What the map is showing today

On Day 257 of the Strait of Hormuz crisis, GEF’s AIS frames of 12 November show about six to seven satellite-only contacts off Bandar Abbas and Qeshm and named vessels in the strait’s southern half (XAVIA, SEA OPERA, FIORA, MADHAVA, KAVIZ, SPONDE), against a single satellite-only contact on 9 November; Bab el-Mandeb shows moving traffic with about seven satellite-only contacts (about seven on 9 November), Suez is dense and normal, Malacca is very dense and Panama is orderly. Since the Day 254 update UKMTO has reported a tanker struck by a projectile north-east of Lima, Oman (10 November), lifting GEF’s floor to at least twenty-four vessels struck since 1 October; an ADNOC-linked vessel reported damaged (10 November), the IRGC’s claim of two supertanker hits (11 November), the earlier IRGC mine claims, the CENTCOM-disabled vessel Huda and Houthi claims are not counted. Brent (Jan) settled at $92.76 on 11 November and EU gas storage fell to 71.61% on gas day 10 November. A floor is not a total: AIS cannot see dark vessels, and the Day 250 paragraph below is kept for the record.

Earlier, on Day 250, GEF’s AIS frames of 5 November showed Iranian coastal vessels off Bandar Abbas and Qeshm with three satellite-only contacts there and no satellite-only contact and no named tanker inside the strait itself; Bab el-Mandeb shows moving traffic with about nine satellite-only contacts (about three on 2 November), Suez is dense and normal, Malacca is very dense and Panama is orderly. Since the Day 247 update UKMTO has confirmed that two projectiles hit the engine room of a tanker about 26 km north-east of Limah, Oman (3 November, no injuries), an attack on an Indian-crewed dhow outbound through the strait (3 November; one crew member died and 13 were rescued) and a vessel holed off Limah (1 November, crew safe), lifting GEF’s floor to at least twenty vessels struck since 1 October; the IRGC’s claims of tankers destroyed by mines (4 November) and burning (5 November) are not counted. Brent (Jan) settled at $94.62 on 4 November, down 8.7%, and EU gas storage fell to 74.07% on gas day 3 November. A floor is not a total: the Day 247 paragraph below is kept for the record.

Earlier, since the Day 243 update UKMTO has reported a tanker hit by explosives attached to its hull by a small boat on Thursday night (29 October), a vessel ablaze 9 nautical miles north of Khasab, Oman (cause unknown, not counted) and, on 1 November, a tanker 72 nautical miles east of Ras Al Khafji, Saudi Arabia, struck by two unidentified projectiles (crew safe), lifting GEF’s floor to at least seventeen vessels struck since 1 October (the figure on 2 November); the IRGC has claimed mine strikes on tankers on 30 and 31 October and 1 November and the UAE has condemned an attack on the Qatari LNG carrier Al Mayeda (single-source), none of which GEF counts; Foreign Minister Araghchi has said talks with Qatari mediators cut Iran’s seven-day plan to a two-day plan (US measures on day one, Hormuz reopens on day two) that the US has not publicly accepted, while CENTCOM rejects his claims and Rubio says no decision has been made on strikes; Trump has said the war ends ‘very soon’ and the 3 November midterms loom; and Brent (Jan) settled at $113.43 on Friday (the expiring December contract $117.64, a fourth straight monthly gain). The last UKMTO-confirmed strike is the tanker off Ras Al Khafji (1 November). Earlier (Day 242), since the Day 241 update Iran’s Gulf Strait Authority has warned the South Korean shipper Sinokor of ‘legal action’ from 1 November and said it has already acted against at least seven of its vessels, Iran’s army has claimed that a tanker hit mines on a route Tehran had not authorised (unconfirmed, not counted), CENTCOM has rejected the IRGC Navy commander’s claim that US forces left the strait, a Pakistani official has said the army chief’s diplomacy proposal has Trump’s approval, and Saudi Arabia says it destroyed five more Houthi ballistic missiles and four drones on 27 October; UKMTO’s warning 183-26 vessel fire off Iraq remains unexplained and uncounted, and the last UKMTO-confirmed strike is still the LPG tanker off Limah on 22 October. GEF’s AIS frames of 28 October show no satellite-AIS tanker signal inside the strait, so GEF cannot confirm a Reuters/ANZ estimate of about 60% of normal flows. Earlier, since the Day 240 update Iran’s armed forces chief of staff has said the strait is ‘completely closed’ to vessels that do not follow Iranian rules (26 October), UKMTO has reported a vessel on fire about 63 nautical miles south-east of Al-Faw, Iraq (warning 183-26; identity, crew status and cause unconfirmed, so GEF does not count it), Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani officials have met President Pezeshkian in Tehran and agreed to keep talking, CNN has reported that US forces could strike within 96 hours of an order Trump has not given, and the Saudi-led coalition destroyed three Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at the Eastern Region and four drones on 27 October; the last UKMTO-confirmed strike remains the LPG tanker off Limah on 22 October, so GEF’s floor stays at least fifteen vessels struck since 1 October. Brent settled $113.88 on Tuesday, down from $115.81 on Monday. UKMTO counts at least 10 vessel attacks in or near the strait since 11 October and 23 since 1 October, nearly double the usual rate, and warns the true count is higher because most ships no longer report; its latest weekly assessment counts 12 attacks (10 in the Hormuz area) and about 254 transits in a week, roughly 70% below pre-war. Since the Day 237 update UKMTO confirmed that an LPG tanker leaving the strait was hit by an unknown projectile about seven nautical miles north-east of Limah, Oman, on 22 October (no casualties; it continued), a strike GEF missed on Friday, so GEF’s floor rises to at least fifteen vessels struck since 1 October. On 23 October the IRGC said two supertankers carrying more than 4.5 million barrels hit mines on an unauthorised route south of the strait and were abandoned; no vessel was named and GEF does not count it. The Joint Maritime Information Center put about 492 vessels waiting outside the strait on 25 October, and the UAE confirmed oil pollution on the Umm Al Quwain coast linked to an earlier tanker attack. Qatari mediators were reported in Tehran on Sunday while Washington weighs strikes (none was reported over the weekend), and on 24 October the Saudi-led coalition intercepted Houthi missiles aimed at Riyadh, Taif and Yanbu; Houthi claims of hits on Yanbu and the Rabigh refinery are unconfirmed. Brent settled $116.72 on Friday, its highest settle since 29 April. Earlier, since the Day 236 update the IRGC has claimed its largest single-day toll (four tankers hit during ship-to-ship transfers and three more mined on 22 October), which CENTCOM called false and GEF does not count; the last UKMTO-confirmed strike remains the tanker off Bukha on 21 October, so GEF’s floor stays at least fourteen. Aramco told essential staff at its Dhahran headquarters to evacuate after Houthi strikes on the site, and the US ordered embassy staff and families out of Saudi Arabia (AFP, Gulf News); President Trump said there are no talks and that something will happen soon. Earlier, since the Day 235 update UKMTO has reported that a tanker at anchor about 11 nautical miles west of Bukha, Oman, was hit by an unknown projectile on 21 October (fire out, all crew safe), lifting GEF’s floor to at least fourteen vessels struck since 1 October; the IRGC claims four more vessels struck and three mined and Iranian state TV says seven tankers, none verified and none counted by GEF. On 21 October an attack on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam killed two and injured eight (Saudi civil aviation authority) and debris from an intercepted drone aimed at the Shaybah oilfield killed two, and the US ordered non-emergency staff and their families out of Saudi Arabia (CBS, Reuters). Kpler data cited by the Wall Street Journal put flows through the strait near 14 million b/d, about 82% of pre-war, a preliminary estimate at the top of the independent range. Earlier, the IRGC said that two, then a third, tankers hit mines on a route south of the strait; no vessel was named and nothing was independently confirmed, so GEF does not count them, while Reuters, citing LSEG analysts, says attacks have spread as far as the Gulf of Oman and Kpler counts at least 18 vessels attacked in two weeks. GEF found no new UKMTO-confirmed strike for 19–20 October. On 17 October a tanker was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade fired from a small boat about 78 nautical miles north-east of Jubail, Saudi Arabia, damaging its aft port quarter; the IRGC says a supertanker carrying about two million barrels hit a mine and caught fire, which is unverified and unnamed, while CENTCOM says it has cleared the strait of mines and that ships are being hit by projectiles. On 18 October a tug about 20 nautical miles north-east of Khor Fakkan was struck by two unidentified projectiles with one minor injury (UKMTO), and JMIC says there is no substantiation for the IRGC’s mine claims. On 16 October a tanker was struck about 68 nautical miles north-east of Al Jubail, and the Singapore-flagged container ship GFS Pride sank on 14 October after a projectile strike (all 21 crew rescued). At least fifteen vessels have been struck since 1 October by GEF’s count (the latest, an LPG tanker off Limah, Oman, on 22 October), a floor rather than a total: the Kuwaiti VLCC Kazimah III, the Panama-flagged Uhud, Lipsi, an inbound vessel hit by a drone, On Peace (6 October, 12 crew injured), Acers (7 October, off Qatar), the laden VLCC GEM NO.2 (9 October, off the UAE), Valthera (10 October) and Angola Prosperity (11 October), then GFS Pride, GFS Giselle, Al Saadiyat and Alfonso on 13 October. Iranian claims of further nightly strikes are unverified and not counted, and CENTCOM’s figure of about 400 commercial transits and 100 million barrels in a week cannot be verified by GEF; Kpler has 11.6 mb/d in the seven days to 13 October, about 68% of the pre-war baseline. GEF’s 27 October audit of the Bandar Abbas and Qeshm frame again returns the Iranian coastal cluster (BARIN 313, HAMD, MARIVAN, DEVREZ, ATEELA 2, HASNA, CHLOE, COBA, DAHAB) with vessels off Khasab and Tunb (NIKA, GAS SINGAPORE) and no satellite-only contact or named tanker in the strait itself, so it can neither confirm nor deny the IRGC claims. Diplomacy is deadlocked: on 20 October spokesman Baghaei said Iran will leave no attack unanswered and is not negotiating on the nuclear issue, and Foreign Minister Araghchi said on 18 October that Tehran is still reviewing US comments on its seven-day plan and that the strait would reopen on day six if the US lifts its blockade and oil sanctions and agrees a ceasefire on all fronts; on 21 October he added that the strait will not be ‘open to everyone’ until the US accepts Iran’s terms, with indirect talks via Pakistan and Qatar continuing but little chance of a breakthrough, while the US blockade of Iranian ports remains in force. Elsewhere the picture is normal or improving: named traffic (GROSSULYAR, PASSIONATE WARRIOR, FLAVIN, TRIDENT 9, SPARTAN, FENOR) is moving through the Bab el-Mandeb approaches, with about eight satellite-only contacts in a wide frame (about six on 26 October, twelve on 23 October, eight on 22 October, about four on 20 October), Suez traffic is dense and normal, Malacca is very dense along the strait and at Singapore/Johor and Panama is orderly at both approaches, with no disruption signature on the 27 October frames. The Saudi–Houthi exchange is now aimed at the bypass and Saudi territory: on 16 October a Saudi-led coalition intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at Yanbu, the Red Sea port Saudi Arabia uses around Hormuz; on 17 October it said it intercepted four drones over Riyadh and other regions; on 18 October a Houthi projectile hit a residential area of Najran (six injured) while the Kingdom Centre in Riyadh told tenants to work remotely; and on 19 October the Houthis claimed strikes on Riyadh airport and Aramco sites at Yanbu and Shaybah, which Saudi authorities did not confirm and Reuters could not verify; on 20 October Saudi forces intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile aimed at Riyadh and a drone and missile later in the day, and Reuters put the toll at the Shabwa camp at 73.

Read every vessel count here as a floor, not a total. Kpler data reported via CNN found 72 of 84 crude-laden tankers (86%) transiting since 7 July sailed with AIS switched off, most via the UN-authorised Omani corridor and frequently using ship-to-ship transfers. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright has argued flows are higher than tracking services capture, and GEF accepts that as a fair caveat — applied consistently it means an AIS map understates traffic in exactly the conditions where traffic matters most.

Two further distortions are worth knowing. CNN reports GPS spoofing as an ongoing problem around both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, which corrupts position data rather than removing it. And a share of contacts appear as [SAT-AIS] — visible to satellite receivers but not terrestrial ones. GEF logs that count each morning: it has run between three and roughly twelve at Bab el-Mandeb over the past week, and a single day’s move in either direction is recorded but not interpreted, because one morning is not a trend.

Why it matters: a live map is evidence, not truth. Where operators have an incentive to be unobserved, absence of signal is itself the signal — and the honest use of this page is to read it alongside the transit counts and dated sources on the Hormuz tracker, not instead of them.

About this map

The map above shows live AIS (Automatic Identification System) positions of tankers, LNG carriers and energy-related shipping worldwide, embedded from MarineTraffic. AIS is the maritime equivalent of aviation transponders: vessels broadcast their identity, position, course and speed to nearby ships and shore stations. The MarineTraffic platform aggregates this data into a near-live picture of global commercial shipping. Positions are indicative rather than precisely real-time; refresh frequency varies by vessel class, region and AIS coverage density.

Energy shipping is concentrated in a handful of strategically critical chokepoints. Five chokepoints together carry the majority of seaborne crude oil, refined product and liquefied natural gas trade. Understanding the live AIS picture at these chokepoints is one of the highest-signal indicators of energy-supply disruption, because tanker behaviour responds to operational risk faster than any other observable variable: tankers slow, divert, anchor offshore, or accelerate into safe waters within hours of geopolitical events.

Strait of Hormuz

The narrow waterway between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula has historically carried approximately 20% of global oil and a substantial share of refined-product and LNG trade. Since February 28, 2026 traffic has run far below the pre-war baseline of roughly 130 transits a day. Kpler counted three on 17 September, the lowest of the war. Barrel estimates diverge widely: independent trackers put flows at 3.7–8m b/d, while US official statements imply up to about 16.4m b/d. Much of the traffic that does move runs with AIS switched off or via ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman, so this map understates it. For the day count, dated sources and full timeline, see the Hormuz tracker.

Bab el-Mandeb (Red Sea / Suez Canal)

The southern entrance to the Red Sea, between Yemen and Djibouti, has been under intermittent attack risk from Houthi maritime forces since late 2023. As Hormuz-bound traffic has rerouted, Bab el-Mandeb has absorbed displaced European-bound flows, with vessel densities in the Red Sea and at the Suez Canal northbound queue running above pre-2026 norms. The Suez Canal itself, while a fixed-width waterway, has not been a binding constraint in 2026; the binding constraint upstream remains willingness of operators to transit Bab el-Mandeb. The Saudi East–West pipeline restarted on 22 September to feed Yanbu on the Red Sea and carried about 3.5m b/d on 28 September, with Yanbu loading again at roughly half of pre-attack rates, after the Houthis fired missiles at the Yanbu area on 24 September; Houthi forces also continue to advance along the Yemeni coast.

Strait of Malacca / Singapore Strait

The principal east-west chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, carrying the majority of seaborne crude moving from the Middle East and Africa to East Asian refining centres. Malacca has densified materially since February 28, 2026 as the redirection of cargoes that previously transited Hormuz adds traffic load. Singapore's anchorage areas show elevated holding patterns. Indonesian and Malaysian patrol activity remains routine; no acute security risk at the chokepoint itself.

Panama Canal

The lock-based canal between the Atlantic and Pacific is constrained by water-level seasonality rather than geopolitical risk. The 2024-2025 water level recovery has held into 2026, with normal transit slot allocations restored. Panama is a relatively minor chokepoint for crude oil — most movements are LNG carriers serving Asian markets from US Gulf Coast terminals.

Turkish Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles)

The narrow waterways connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, regulated under the Montreux Convention. Russian crude exports through the Black Sea (including Novorossiysk port flows) transit the Bosphorus southbound; the post-April 6 CPC attack reduced Novorossiysk capacity to approximately 65%. Turkish authorities have not invoked Montreux restrictions during the current cycle.

How to read the map

Vessel symbols on the map are colour-coded by ship class: tankers, gas carriers, cargo ships, passenger vessels and others. Click a vessel to see its name, IMO number, destination and ETA. For chokepoint-specific analysis with vessel counts and disruption indicators, see the chokepoints page. For the wider energy supply context that this maritime picture sits inside, see the main dashboard and the weekly risk analysis briefing.

The MarineTraffic embed is a third-party service; positions are indicative and may lag actual vessel movements by several minutes to several hours depending on AIS coverage. For operational maritime decisions, vessels and operators should rely on their own AIS receivers and authoritative naval coordination bodies (UKMTO, Combined Maritime Forces, IMO). Nothing on this page is a navigation aid.