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Marine Traffic Chokepoints

Maritime Chokepoints — Live Flow Status & Risk Tracker

Five monitored maritime chokepoints — flow status, risk ratings and disruption analysis

Critical
Watch / Elevated
Normal
Chokepoint Status Jul 24
Strait of Hormuz
CRITICAL · Day 157 · Iran denies Trump's claim of direct US talks, says it's negotiating only with Oman on shipping routes · Iran's FM Araghchi says the Oman talks are \"nearing completion\" · Brent settled -5.69% Monday at $82.92, capping a ~24% July gain that has now partly unwound · GEF's own AIS continues to show the Hormuz persistent core present, no physical change registered on the water
Bab el-Mandeb
CRITICAL, worsening · the threat this page has tracked since Jul 14 has now materialized: Yemen's Houthis say they fired missiles and drones directly at two Saudi tankers — the Encelia and the Layla — in the Red Sea overnight Jul 22-23, the first confirmed direct tanker strikes in this chokepoint this cycle · five tankers reportedly changed course Jul 22 after Houthi warnings to avoid Saudi ports · GEF's own AIS continues to show dense, ordinary transiting traffic (ROYAL ICE, CRYSTAL persistent) with no confirmed closure of the strait itself — the strikes are real and escalatory, but transit has not stopped
Suez Canal
Large, dense persistent traffic continuing (TORNADO, ENERGOS FORCE, CORE AXIS, WALRUS, DESH UJAALA, SUN, ZUMBA and others confirmed across multiple AIS frames this week) · absorbing Hormuz overflow · unconstrained baseline, distinct from the two Gulf/Red Sea chokepoints above
Strait of Malacca
Consistently dense traffic in this week's AIS frames · Singapore mega-cluster remains extremely dense · elevated
Panama Canal
Orderly, full 50ft draft, no restrictions through Dec 2026 (ACP) — background status unchanged this week; El Niño risk flagged for 2027, not 2026
Tanker Clusters
Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb
Houthis' direct strikes on the Encelia and Layla (Jul 22-23) are the week's dominant tanker-risk story — the first confirmed physical attacks in this chokepoint, beyond the earlier declared Saudi-shipping embargo
Persian Gulf / Hormuz core
GEF's own AIS persistent core (HARBOUR PHOENIX, MARIVAN, CASPIA, GPS GOD, SOLIX) has held continuously for a full week, confirmed again Friday — the physical picture is more stable than the week's rhetoric alone would suggest
Malacca Surge Zone
Consistently dense traffic across this week's AIS frames · Singapore mega-cluster · bypass pivot entrenched
Why It Matters
These five chokepoints carry the bulk of seaborne energy. The Strait of Hormuz alone moves ~20% of global oil and ~25% of global LNG. This week the conflict genuinely widened geographically: a drone struck a US-owned LNG vessel at Egypt's Damietta port, near the Suez Canal, the first attack on Egyptian soil this war, while Kazakhstan's CPC terminal in the Black Sea suspended loadings for a third time. GEF's own AIS keeps showing the core vessel presence at Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb holding even through the sharpest week of price and military escalation yet. A disruption at any one node propagates through the entire global energy system — this week's Damietta strike is exactly that propagation, reaching a node (Egypt) with no direct role in the underlying US-Iran conflict.
Data Note
Chokepoint flow estimates compiled from Kpler, IMF PortWatch, UKMTO, IEA and GEF AIS analysis. Live vessel positions on the Live Traffic tab are provided by MarineTraffic. Some vessels may not broadcast AIS for commercial or security reasons.

About maritime chokepoints

Five narrow waterways together carry the majority of seaborne crude oil, refined petroleum products and liquefied natural gas trade globally. Disruption at any one of them rapidly translates into supply tightness in downstream markets. This page tracks operational flow status and risk ratings at each chokepoint, derived from a combination of AIS vessel tracking, government and operator filings, and verified incident reports.

Strait of Hormuz

The narrow waterway between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and onward to the Indian Ocean. Hormuz has historically carried approximately 20% of global oil and a substantial share of refined-product and LNG trade — Qatar's entire LNG export portfolio transits the strait, along with the bulk of crude oil from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE and Iran itself. Since February 28, 2026 the strait has been effectively closed to commercial transit; AIS-frame analysis confirms traffic at approximately 5% of pre-war baseline volumes. The Persian Gulf side hosts an extended queue of stranded tankers (approximately 166–230 vessels in mid-May 2026), and approximately 22,500 mariners on 1,550+ commercial vessels remain in the broader strait region per US Joint Chiefs. For the full live status, day count, oil-price impact and crisis timeline, see the dedicated Strait of Hormuz status page.

Bab el-Mandeb

The southern entrance to the Red Sea, between Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea. Bab el-Mandeb carries approximately 10–12% of global seaborne crude trade under normal conditions and is the only maritime route between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. The chokepoint has been under intermittent attack risk from Houthi maritime forces since late 2023; many vessels now transit with AIS transponders dark for operational security, complicating accurate vessel counts. The threat this page tracked as a stated-but-unexecuted risk through most of July has now materialized: overnight Jul 22-23, Yemen's Houthis said they fired missiles and drones directly at two Saudi oil tankers — the Encelia and the Layla — for "violating a blockade," the first confirmed direct tanker strikes in this specific chokepoint this cycle. This followed the Houthis' Jul 20 declaration of a maritime embargo against Saudi shipping through Bab el-Mandeb, and five tankers reportedly changed course Jul 22 after Houthi warnings to avoid Saudi ports. It directly threatens the Saudi East-West pipeline and the UAE's Fujairah route (itself struck earlier this cycle) that have functioned as Hormuz's main bypass valves throughout this crisis. Despite the confirmed strikes, GEF's own AIS audit across this week's frames continues to show dense, ordinary transiting traffic in the strait, with persistent vessels (RUI FU SHENG, ROYAL ICE, CRYSTAL) still present — the attacks are real and escalatory, but they have not yet produced a confirmed closure of the strait itself, and much of the remainder still routes around the Cape of Good Hope at significant time and cost penalty for those unwilling to risk transit at all.

Suez Canal

The man-made waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, operated by Egypt's Suez Canal Authority. Suez itself has not been physically constrained in 2026 — the binding constraint upstream is willingness to transit Bab el-Mandeb given the Houthi threat. Roughly 12% of global trade continues to route through Suez despite the risk; Egypt has offered discounted tolls to larger vessels to help retain traffic, and lost an estimated $7 billion in canal revenue in 2024 alone to Houthi-driven rerouting. GEF's Jul 14 evening AIS sample recorded roughly 35 named vessels in the frame, consistent with the canal continuing to absorb some Hormuz-diverted flow.

Strait of Malacca

The principal east-west chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, running between Indonesia and Malaysia. Malacca carries approximately 25-30% of global seaborne trade by volume and is the primary route for Middle Eastern crude moving to Chinese, Korean, Japanese and Southeast Asian refining centres. As Hormuz-bound cargoes have rerouted, Malacca traffic has materially densified — GEF's Jul 14 evening AIS sample around the Singapore Strait approach recorded well over 150 named vessels in a single frame, one of the densest concentrations of shipping anywhere in the world, with concentrated holding patterns near Singapore and Johor Bahru. The chokepoint is not currently under direct security threat, but the capacity headroom remains thin.

Panama Canal

The lock-based canal between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, operated by the Panama Canal Authority (ACP). Panama is a relatively minor chokepoint for crude oil but a significant route for LNG carriers serving Asian markets from US Gulf Coast terminals (though LNG transits remain roughly 73% below pre-drought levels, with carriers still preferring the Cape of Good Hope route even post-recovery). The 2023-24 drought that cut daily transits to as low as 18 vessels is fully resolved: Gatun and Alajuela Lakes sit at historically high levels, full 50-foot draft has been restored, and the ACP does not forecast transit restrictions through December 31, 2026 — though it is monitoring a possible El Niño-driven tightening in 2027. Auction prices for non-reserved transit slots remain sharply elevated versus pre-drought levels. GEF's Jul 14 evening AIS sample recorded roughly 22-23 named vessels in the frame, consistent with orderly operations.

How to interpret this data

Chokepoint flow estimates are not precise vessel counts — they aggregate AIS observations, port-state inspection records, satellite imagery review, operator filings and inter-agency intelligence. Some vessels do not broadcast AIS for commercial reasons (sanctions compliance, route confidentiality) or for security reasons (Bab el-Mandeb transit avoidance). Where AIS is suppressed, vessel counts are inferred from satellite imagery and port-call records and explicitly flagged in the data note. For live position data on individual vessels see the live traffic map. For the broader supply consequences of chokepoint disruption see the main dashboard and weekly risk analysis briefing.