About maritime chokepoints
Five narrow waterways together carry the majority of seaborne crude oil, refined petroleum products and liquefied natural gas trade globally. Disruption at any one of them rapidly translates into supply tightness in downstream markets. This page tracks operational flow status and risk ratings at each chokepoint, derived from a combination of AIS vessel tracking, government and operator filings, and verified incident reports.
Strait of Hormuz
The narrow waterway between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and onward to the Indian Ocean. Hormuz has historically carried approximately 20% of global oil and a substantial share of refined-product and LNG trade — Qatar's entire LNG export portfolio transits the strait, along with the bulk of crude oil from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE and Iran itself. Since February 28, 2026 the strait has been severely restricted. Updated 29 September (Day 213): the diplomatic signals of the past week have not moved the flow data. Iran’s seven-day plan of 25 September — blockade and sanctions lifted first, the strait reopened on day seven — was rejected by President Trump on 26 September; indirect talks resumed through Qatari mediators on 28 September, with no deal. Windward counted 6, 13 and 25 commercial transits on 25, 26 and 27 September (the last 9 in, 16 out, 14 dark), against about 130 a day before the war, and GEF’s satellite-AIS frames on 29 September again showed only Iran’s coastal traffic. Independent estimates put current flows at 3.7m b/d (Tankertrackers.com, seven-day AIS) to 6–8m b/d (Bloomberg satellite imagery with Signal Maritime), roughly half pre-war or less, against about 16.4m b/d implied by CENTCOM’s six-month-high claim and 10m b/d cited by the US Energy Secretary. On vessels observed, Kpler counted three transits on 17 September, the lowest of the war, against a pre-war norm near 130 a day. GEF treats official figures as an upper bound and tracker counts as a floor, and publishes the range rather than a single number. Read vessel counts here as a measure of visible, insurable, conventional traffic rather than of supply; the gap is the dark-shuttle trade, in which crude transits unobserved and transfers to tankers in the Gulf of Oman. The stranded-tanker queue on the Persian Gulf side peaked at approximately 166–230 vessels in mid-May 2026, and around 22,500 mariners on 1,550+ commercial vessels were in the broader strait region per US Joint Chiefs at that time — both figures are dated to that period and GEF has not re-verified them since. For the full live status, day count, oil-price impact and crisis timeline, see the dedicated Strait of Hormuz status page.
Bab el-Mandeb
The southern entrance to the Red Sea, between Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea. Bab el-Mandeb carries approximately 10–12% of global seaborne crude trade under normal conditions and is the only maritime route between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. The chokepoint has been under intermittent attack risk from Houthi maritime forces since late 2023; many vessels now transit with AIS transponders dark for operational security, complicating accurate vessel counts. Direct tanker strikes began in late July, and the Saudi–Houthi exchange has escalated into September as Houthi forces advance along the coast. On 24 September Saudi Arabia intercepted six Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at Taif and the Yanbu area — the Red Sea terminal fed by the East–West pipeline that restarted on 22 September. The pipeline carried about 3.5m b/d on 28 September and Yanbu is loading again at roughly half of pre-attack rates (satellite-confirmed; Kpler, OilPrice, Bloomberg), after Reuters had reported loadings not resumed on 24 September; GEF’s intervening ‘disputed’ label is withdrawn. GEF’s AIS audit on 29 September shows named traffic in the narrows and six to eight satellite-only contacts, inside the 3–12 band tracked since August; there is no confirmed closure of the strait itself, and traffic unwilling to take the risk still routes around the Cape of Good Hope.
Suez Canal
The man-made waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, operated by Egypt's Suez Canal Authority. Suez itself has not been physically constrained in 2026 — the binding constraint upstream is willingness to transit Bab el-Mandeb given the Houthi threat. Roughly 12% of global trade continues to route through Suez despite the risk; Egypt has offered discounted tolls to larger vessels to help retain traffic, and lost an estimated $7 billion in canal revenue in 2024 alone to Houthi-driven rerouting. The EIA’s September outlook records Saudi Arabia routing more crude through Suez, and with the East–West pipeline restarted on 22 September traders are positioning tankers at Port Said and Sidi Kerir for rising Yanbu loadings. GEF’s AIS audit on 29 September shows convoys under way in both directions and busy anchorages at Port Said, Suez and Alexandria, with one satellite-only contact near Aqaba. The expected rise in Saudi volume now depends on Yanbu loadings building beyond roughly half of pre-attack rates, which needs the pumping-station repairs and continued air defence.
Strait of Malacca
The principal east-west chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, running between Indonesia and Malaysia. Malacca carries approximately 25-30% of global seaborne trade by volume and is the primary route for Middle Eastern crude moving to Chinese, Korean, Japanese and Southeast Asian refining centres. As Hormuz-bound cargoes have rerouted, Malacca traffic has materially densified — GEF’s AIS check on 25 September around the Singapore Strait approach showed one of the densest concentrations of shipping anywhere in the world, with concentrated holding patterns near Singapore and Johor Bahru. The chokepoint is not currently under direct security threat, but the capacity headroom remains thin.
Panama Canal
The lock-based canal between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, operated by the Panama Canal Authority (ACP). Panama is a relatively minor chokepoint for crude oil but a significant route for LNG carriers serving Asian markets from US Gulf Coast terminals (though LNG transits remain roughly 73% below pre-drought levels, with carriers still preferring the Cape of Good Hope route even post-recovery). The 2023-24 drought that cut daily transits to as low as 18 vessels is fully resolved: Gatun and Alajuela Lakes sit at historically high levels, full 50-foot draft has been restored, and the ACP does not forecast transit restrictions through December 31, 2026 — though it is monitoring a possible El Niño-driven tightening in 2027. Auction prices for non-reserved transit slots remain sharply elevated versus pre-drought levels. GEF’s AIS check on 25 September showed orderly vessel groups at both approaches near the Panama City/canal approach, consistent with orderly operations.
How to interpret this data
Chokepoint flow estimates are not precise vessel counts — they aggregate AIS observations, port-state inspection records, satellite imagery review, operator filings and inter-agency intelligence. Some vessels do not broadcast AIS for commercial reasons (sanctions compliance, route confidentiality) or for security reasons (Bab el-Mandeb transit avoidance). Where AIS is suppressed, vessel counts are inferred from satellite imagery and port-call records and explicitly flagged in the data note. For live position data on individual vessels see the live traffic map. For the broader supply consequences of chokepoint disruption see the main dashboard and weekly risk analysis briefing.