About maritime chokepoints
Five narrow waterways together carry the majority of seaborne crude oil, refined petroleum products and liquefied natural gas trade globally. Disruption at any one of them rapidly translates into supply tightness in downstream markets. This page tracks operational flow status and risk ratings at each chokepoint, derived from a combination of AIS vessel tracking, government and operator filings, and verified incident reports.
Strait of Hormuz
The narrow waterway between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and onward to the Indian Ocean. Hormuz has historically carried approximately 20% of global oil and a substantial share of refined-product and LNG trade — Qatar's entire LNG export portfolio transits the strait, along with the bulk of crude oil from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE and Iran itself. Since February 28, 2026 the strait has been severely restricted. Updated 12 November (Day 257): UKMTO has reported a tanker struck north-east of Lima, Oman (10 November), lifting GEF’s floor to at least twenty-four vessels struck since 1 October; an ADNOC-linked vessel reported damaged (10 November) and the IRGC’s claim of two supertanker hits (11 November) are not counted. GEF’s 12 November frames show about six to seven satellite-only contacts off Bandar Abbas and Qeshm and named vessels in the southern strait (XAVIA, SEA OPERA, FIORA, MADHAVA), against one satellite-only contact on 9 November, and about seven satellite-only contacts at Bab el-Mandeb; AIS cannot confirm or deny transits. Brent (Jan) settled at $92.76 on 11 November and EU gas storage fell to 71.61%. Earlier, updated 9 November (Day 254): UKMTO had reported a tanker on fire off Khasab and a second tanker hit outbound (both 7 November) and a Greek-managed tanker hit off Qatar with one seafarer killed (4 November), lifting GEF’s floor to at least twenty-three vessels struck since 1 October; the IRGC’s mine and fire claims (5 and 8 November), the Huda and Houthi claims are not counted. GEF’s 9 November frames show a single satellite-only contact and no named tanker inside the strait itself, with about seven satellite-only contacts at Bab el-Mandeb. Brent (Jan) settled at $98.32 on 6 November, down 13.3% on the week, and EU gas storage fell to 72.65%. Earlier, updated 5 November (Day 250): UKMTO confirmed that a tanker and an Indian-crewed dhow were struck off Limah, Oman (3 November) and a vessel holed off Limah (1 November), lifting GEF’s floor to at least twenty vessels struck since 1 October; the IRGC’s mine and fire claims of 4–5 November are not counted. GEF’s 5 November frames show no satellite-only contact and no named tanker inside the strait itself, with about nine satellite-only contacts at Bab el-Mandeb. Brent (Jan) settled at $94.62 on 4 November, down 8.7%, and EU gas storage fell to 74.07%. Earlier, updated 28 October (Day 242): Since the Day 241 update Iran’s Gulf Strait Authority has warned the South Korean shipper Sinokor of ‘legal action’ from 1 November and said it has already acted against at least seven of its vessels, Iran’s army has claimed that a tanker hit mines on a route Tehran had not authorised (unconfirmed, not counted), CENTCOM has rejected the IRGC Navy commander’s claim that US forces left the strait, a Pakistani official has said the army chief’s diplomacy proposal has Trump’s approval, and Saudi Arabia says it destroyed five more Houthi ballistic missiles and four drones on 27 October; UKMTO’s warning 183-26 vessel fire off Iraq remains unexplained and uncounted, and the last UKMTO-confirmed strike is still the LPG tanker off Limah on 22 October. GEF’s AIS frames of 28 October show no satellite-AIS tanker signal inside the strait, so GEF cannot confirm a Reuters/ANZ estimate of about 60% of normal flows. Earlier, since the Day 240 update Iran’s armed forces chief of staff has said the strait is ‘completely closed’ to vessels that do not follow Iranian rules (26 October), UKMTO has reported a vessel on fire about 63 nautical miles south-east of Al-Faw, Iraq (warning 183-26; identity, crew status and cause unconfirmed, so GEF does not count it), Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani officials have met President Pezeshkian in Tehran and agreed to keep talking, CNN has reported that US forces could strike within 96 hours of an order Trump has not given, and the Saudi-led coalition destroyed three Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at the Eastern Region and four drones on 27 October; the last UKMTO-confirmed strike remains the LPG tanker off Limah on 22 October, so GEF’s floor stays at least fifteen vessels struck since 1 October. Brent settled $113.88 on Tuesday, down from $115.81 on Monday. UKMTO counts at least 10 vessel attacks in or near the strait since 11 October and 23 since 1 October, nearly double the usual rate, and warns the true count is higher because most ships no longer report; its latest weekly assessment counts 12 attacks (10 in the Hormuz area) and about 254 transits in a week, roughly 70% below pre-war. Since the Day 237 update UKMTO confirmed that an LPG tanker leaving the strait was hit by an unknown projectile about seven nautical miles north-east of Limah, Oman, on 22 October (no casualties; it continued), a strike GEF missed on Friday, so GEF’s floor rises to at least fifteen vessels struck since 1 October. On 23 October the IRGC said two supertankers carrying more than 4.5 million barrels hit mines on an unauthorised route south of the strait and were abandoned; no vessel was named and GEF does not count it. The Joint Maritime Information Center put about 492 vessels waiting outside the strait on 25 October, and the UAE confirmed oil pollution on the Umm Al Quwain coast linked to an earlier tanker attack. Qatari mediators were reported in Tehran on Sunday while Washington weighs strikes (none was reported over the weekend), and on 24 October the Saudi-led coalition intercepted Houthi missiles aimed at Riyadh, Taif and Yanbu; Houthi claims of hits on Yanbu and the Rabigh refinery are unconfirmed. Brent settled $116.72 on Friday, its highest settle since 29 April. Earlier, since the Day 236 update the IRGC has claimed its largest single-day toll (four tankers hit during ship-to-ship transfers and three more mined on 22 October), which CENTCOM called false and GEF does not count; the last UKMTO-confirmed strike remains the tanker off Bukha on 21 October, so GEF’s floor stays at least fourteen. Aramco told essential staff at its Dhahran headquarters to evacuate after Houthi strikes on the site, and the US ordered embassy staff and families out of Saudi Arabia (AFP, Gulf News); President Trump said there are no talks and that something will happen soon. Earlier, since the Day 235 update UKMTO has reported that a tanker at anchor about 11 nautical miles west of Bukha, Oman, was hit by an unknown projectile on 21 October (fire out, all crew safe), lifting GEF’s floor to at least fourteen vessels struck since 1 October; the IRGC claims four more vessels struck and three mined and Iranian state TV says seven tankers, none verified and none counted by GEF. On 21 October an attack on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam killed two and injured eight (Saudi civil aviation authority) and debris from an intercepted drone aimed at the Shaybah oilfield killed two, and the US ordered non-emergency staff and their families out of Saudi Arabia (CBS, Reuters). Kpler data cited by the Wall Street Journal put flows through the strait near 14 million b/d, about 82% of pre-war, a preliminary estimate at the top of the independent range. Earlier, the IRGC said that two, then a third, tankers hit mines on a route south of the strait; no vessel was named and nothing was independently confirmed, so GEF does not count them, while Reuters, citing LSEG analysts, says attacks have spread as far as the Gulf of Oman and Kpler counts at least 18 vessels attacked in two weeks. GEF found no new UKMTO-confirmed strike for 19–20 October. On 17 October a tanker was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade fired from a small boat about 78 nautical miles north-east of Jubail, Saudi Arabia, damaging its aft port quarter; the IRGC says a supertanker carrying about two million barrels hit a mine and caught fire, which is unverified and unnamed, while CENTCOM says it has cleared the strait of mines and that ships are being hit by projectiles. On 18 October a tug about 20 nautical miles north-east of Khor Fakkan was struck by two unidentified projectiles with one minor injury (UKMTO), and JMIC says there is no substantiation for the IRGC’s mine claims. On 16 October a tanker was struck about 68 nautical miles north-east of Al Jubail, and the Singapore-flagged container ship GFS Pride sank on 14 October after a projectile strike (all 21 crew rescued). At least fifteen vessels have been struck since 1 October by GEF’s count (the latest, an LPG tanker off Limah, Oman, on 22 October), a floor rather than a total: the Kuwaiti VLCC Kazimah III, the Panama-flagged Uhud, Lipsi, an inbound vessel hit by a drone, On Peace (6 October, 12 crew injured), Acers (7 October, off Qatar), the laden VLCC GEM NO.2 (9 October, off the UAE), Valthera (10 October) and Angola Prosperity (11 October), then GFS Pride, GFS Giselle, Al Saadiyat and Alfonso on 13 October. Iranian claims of further nightly strikes are unverified and not counted, and CENTCOM’s figure of about 400 commercial transits and 100 million barrels in a week cannot be verified by GEF; Kpler has 11.6 mb/d in the seven days to 13 October, about 68% of the pre-war baseline. GEF’s 27 October audit of the Bandar Abbas and Qeshm frame again returns the Iranian coastal cluster (BARIN 313, HAMD, MARIVAN, DEVREZ, ATEELA 2, HASNA, CHLOE, COBA, DAHAB) with vessels off Khasab and Tunb (NIKA, GAS SINGAPORE) and no satellite-only contact or named tanker in the strait itself, so it can neither confirm nor deny the IRGC claims. Diplomacy is deadlocked: on 20 October spokesman Baghaei said Iran will leave no attack unanswered and is not negotiating on the nuclear issue, and Foreign Minister Araghchi said on 18 October that Tehran is still reviewing US comments on its seven-day plan and that the strait would reopen on day six if the US lifts its blockade and oil sanctions and agrees a ceasefire on all fronts; on 21 October he added that the strait will not be ‘open to everyone’ until the US accepts Iran’s terms, with indirect talks via Pakistan and Qatar continuing but little chance of a breakthrough, while the US blockade of Iranian ports remains in force. Elsewhere the picture is normal or improving: named traffic (GROSSULYAR, PASSIONATE WARRIOR, FLAVIN, TRIDENT 9, SPARTAN, FENOR) is moving through the Bab el-Mandeb approaches, with about eight satellite-only contacts in a wide frame (about six on 26 October, twelve on 23 October, eight on 22 October, about four on 20 October), Suez traffic is dense and normal, Malacca is very dense along the strait and at Singapore/Johor and Panama is orderly at both approaches, with no disruption signature on the 27 October frames. The Saudi–Houthi exchange is now aimed at the bypass and Saudi territory: on 16 October a Saudi-led coalition intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at Yanbu, the Red Sea port Saudi Arabia uses around Hormuz; on 17 October it said it intercepted four drones over Riyadh and other regions; on 18 October a Houthi projectile hit a residential area of Najran (six injured) while the Kingdom Centre in Riyadh told tenants to work remotely; and on 19 October the Houthis claimed strikes on Riyadh airport and Aramco sites at Yanbu and Shaybah, which Saudi authorities did not confirm and Reuters could not verify; on 20 October Saudi forces intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile aimed at Riyadh and a drone and missile later in the day, and Reuters put the toll at the Shabwa camp at 73.
Bab el-Mandeb
The southern entrance to the Red Sea, between Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea. Bab el-Mandeb carries approximately 10–12% of global seaborne crude trade under normal conditions and is the only maritime route between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. The chokepoint has been under intermittent attack risk from Houthi maritime forces since late 2023; many vessels now transit with AIS transponders dark for operational security, complicating accurate vessel counts. Direct tanker strikes began in late July, and the Saudi–Houthi exchange has escalated into September as Houthi forces advance along the coast. On 24 September Saudi Arabia intercepted six Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at Taif and the Yanbu area — the Red Sea terminal fed by the East–West pipeline that restarted on 22 September. Lloyd's List reports Red Sea tanker loadings rising as Aramco ramps pipeline contingency; GEF's last confirmed throughput reading was ~3.5m b/d on 28 September. GEF's AIS audit on 5 October shows named traffic in the narrows and six to seven satellite-only contacts, inside the 3–12 band tracked since August; there is no confirmed closure of the strait itself, and traffic unwilling to take the risk still routes around the Cape of Good Hope.
Suez Canal
The man-made waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, operated by Egypt's Suez Canal Authority. Suez itself has not been physically constrained in 2026 — the binding constraint upstream is willingness to transit Bab el-Mandeb given the Houthi threat. Roughly 12% of global trade continues to route through Suez despite the risk; Egypt has offered discounted tolls to larger vessels to help retain traffic, and lost an estimated $7 billion in canal revenue in 2024 alone to Houthi-driven rerouting. The EIA’s September outlook records Saudi Arabia routing more crude through Suez, and with the East–West pipeline restarted on 22 September traders are positioning tankers at Port Said and Sidi Kerir for rising Yanbu loadings. GEF's AIS audit on 5 October shows convoys under way in both directions, a northbound queue at Suez and Port Said, busy Port Said and Alexandria anchorages, and IKARIOTIKOS/PUSAKA MALAKA near Aqaba. The expected rise in Saudi volume now depends on Yanbu loadings building beyond roughly half of pre-attack rates, which needs the pumping-station repairs and continued air defence.
Strait of Malacca
The principal east-west chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, running between Indonesia and Malaysia. Malacca carries approximately 25-30% of global seaborne trade by volume and is the primary route for Middle Eastern crude moving to Chinese, Korean, Japanese and Southeast Asian refining centres. As Hormuz-bound cargoes have rerouted, Malacca traffic has materially densified — GEF’s AIS check on 25 September around the Singapore Strait approach showed one of the densest concentrations of shipping anywhere in the world, with concentrated holding patterns near Singapore and Johor Bahru. The chokepoint is not currently under direct security threat, but the capacity headroom remains thin.
Panama Canal
The lock-based canal between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, operated by the Panama Canal Authority (ACP). Panama is a relatively minor chokepoint for crude oil but a significant route for LNG carriers serving Asian markets from US Gulf Coast terminals (though LNG transits remain roughly 73% below pre-drought levels, with carriers still preferring the Cape of Good Hope route even post-recovery). The 2023-24 drought that cut daily transits to as low as 18 vessels is fully resolved: Gatun and Alajuela Lakes sit at historically high levels, full 50-foot draft has been restored, and the ACP does not forecast transit restrictions through December 31, 2026 — though it is monitoring a possible El Niño-driven tightening in 2027. Auction prices for non-reserved transit slots remain sharply elevated versus pre-drought levels. GEF’s AIS check on 25 September showed orderly vessel groups at both approaches near the Panama City/canal approach, consistent with orderly operations.
How to interpret this data
Chokepoint flow estimates are not precise vessel counts — they aggregate AIS observations, port-state inspection records, satellite imagery review, operator filings and inter-agency intelligence. Some vessels do not broadcast AIS for commercial reasons (sanctions compliance, route confidentiality) or for security reasons (Bab el-Mandeb transit avoidance). Where AIS is suppressed, vessel counts are inferred from satellite imagery and port-call records and explicitly flagged in the data note. For live position data on individual vessels see the live traffic map. For the broader supply consequences of chokepoint disruption see the main dashboard and weekly risk analysis briefing.