EU Road Fuel Shortages — Live Status & Disruption Map

Update, 24 September. Two European stories moved this week and they are different in kind, which matters for how each should be read.

Gas is the structural one, and Germany is the problem the aggregate hides. GEF’s direct GIE read puts EU storage at 70.87% on 23 September, against a five-year norm of roughly 86–89%. The injection pace has averaged about +0.20 points a day since 13 September against about +0.25 needed for the relaxed 80% target, so the trajectory is borderline. Correction: on 23 September this page said the pace had halved and called the trajectory off pace, based on a market report of about 69%; the direct read shows the pace had not halved. Germany sits at about 57% of working capacity, roughly 141 TWh — its lowest September reading in 15 to 20 years, against 71–76% a year ago. Klaus Müller, head of the Federal Network Agency, has publicly called the legal 80% target unrealistic; the storage association INES projects closer to 65% by 1 November, and modelled a 2010-type severe winter in which German stores could run dry in January or February with daily gaps reaching 25% of demand. The regulator’s own balancing line belongs alongside that: “Supply is stable and the crunch risk remains low” — explicitly assuming a normal winter and stable imports. TTF fell to €71.86/MWh on the 23rd, its lowest since 4 September, but remains up about 122% year to date.

France is the retail one, and it is not what it first appeared. French stations short of at least one grade reached 16.5–17% on 21 September, with 11% completely dry — but between 86% and 91% of those ruptures sit inside the TotalEnergies network, which has held prices at €1.99/litre petrol and €2.25 diesel since 22 July against market averages of €2.18 and €2.42. That is a price cap concentrating demand faster than resupply, not a barrel that failed to arrive; French strategic reserves are full and refineries are at maximum. GEF initially attributed it to logistics friction and has corrected that publicly. The war link runs one step further back: there is no gap to cap in a €1.70 market. The government’s own count for 28 September was 14% of stations short of at least one fuel (up from 13% on 27 September), with Île-de-France worst at 20%.

Why the distinction matters for the rest of Europe. A distribution failure inside one retailer’s estate is containable and reversible by a pricing decision. A storage season that finishes near 65% in the EU’s largest consumer is neither. And unlike oil — which spent this fortnight demonstrating that barrels can be re-routed through Oman and back again — gas has no equivalent workaround.

Status of the rest of the map. France’s government count was 14% of stations short of a fuel on 28 September, up from 13% the day before and below the 21 September peak; GEF does not extrapolate the daily series. Germany’s PCK Schwedt refinery has lost about 17% of its crude throughput (roughly 40,000–43,000 b/d of Kazakh-origin crude) since Russia halted transit through Druzhba’s northern leg on 1 May — now Day 152 — with no retail-pump shortage reported in Berlin–Brandenburg. Ireland remains on watch after its April protest cycle. A correction: this page described Hungary’s foreign-plate price cap as “winding down” for three months after the government abolished it on 26 June; it has been removed from the map. Slovenia’s rationing pin was removed on 1 July.

The oil backdrop. The Strait of Hormuz is on Day 213 and rated CRITICAL: Iran’s seven-day reopening plan of 25 September was rejected by President Trump on 26 September, and indirect talks resumed through Qatar on 28 September without a deal. Brent settled $105.28 on Monday 28 September. Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline restarted after an 11-day halt and carried about 3.5m b/d on 28 September, with Yanbu loading again at roughly half of pre-attack rates, which moves Saudi crude back toward the Red Sea and Suez rather than adding supply. For European drivers the channel is diesel: Washington floated and then denied a 90-day US diesel export ban on 23 September — a reminder that the US cargoes Europe relies on to replace Gulf and Russian product are themselves politically exposed while US distillate stocks sit 12% below their five-year average.

Europe imports refined product. That is the exposure, and it is now being tested from three directions at once — which matters more than any one of them alone, because a market can usually cover one damaged region by importing from another.

Russia. Ukrainian strikes have removed roughly a quarter of Russian refining capacity across the first half of 2026 (Reuters), with S&P Global citing CERA estimates of more than 2.5 million b/d offline at end-June — over a third of the total — and Russian crude runs at a 17-year low. Russia is the world’s second-largest diesel exporter after the US; its diesel exports have run at under half seasonal norms, and Moscow has banned petrol exports to 31 January 2027. Reuters reported on 15 September that Kinef was shut and Volgograd and NORSI were running at about 25% of capacity — three of the six plants that make roughly half of Russia’s diesel.

The Gulf. Saudi Arabia’s ~400 kb/d Jazan refinery was shut on 27 July after a Houthi strike, with restart last guided to 30 August; GEF has not confirmed its current status. Hormuz, on Day 213 and CRITICAL, constrains what moves out of the region at all, and the East–West pipeline that bypasses it restarted only on 22 September at a low rate.

Europe’s own base. Refinery closures and depleted inventories leave little domestic buffer, and the arbitrage that would normally pull cargoes from the US Gulf has been shut for stretches of the summer while US diesel exports ran at record rates.

The result is visible in margins rather than at the forecourt. European diesel prices are up roughly 40% since mid-June; ULSD cracks in the Amsterdam–Rotterdam–Antwerp hub have surged, and the gasoil curve is steeply backwardated — the market’s way of saying barrels are wanted now, not next month. Analysts broadly expect refining margins to stay well above historical norms through the end of 2026, with normalisation unlikely before 2028 under most scenarios.

Why it matters: diesel is the fuel of freight, agriculture, construction and back-up power generation. A crude shock reaches European drivers slowly, through the pump. A diesel shock reaches European households quickly, through the price of everything that is moved by lorry — and it arrives just as the Northern Hemisphere harvest and the winter heating season begin to compete for the same barrels. GEF holds the EU road-fuel pins at their current tiers because forecourt supply is not disrupted; the risk sits one layer up, and it is rising.

France · ACTIVE since 18 September — price-cap distortion, 14% of stations short on the government count (28 Sep); peak 16.5–17% (21 Sep). The daily series ran 11% of stations out of stock on 18 September, 13% on the 19th, 15% on the 20th and 16.5–17% missing at least one grade on the 21st, of which 11% were completely dry — about 2,500 of 9,900 stations. Between 86% and 91% of ruptures are at TotalEnergies stations, which have held €1.99/L petrol and €2.25/L diesel since 22 July against market averages of €2.18 and €2.42. Economy Minister Roland Lescure calls it a commercial problem rather than a national logistics failure; reserves are full and refineries at maximum. GEF first attributed it to logistics friction and corrected that on 22 September. Two measures circulate and should not be mixed: stations missing one grade, and stations completely dry. The pin is red because GEF’s colour rule scores the retail condition, not the cause.

Slovenia · REMOVED from map Jul 1 (daily volume caps demoted to watch Jun 22, removed entirely Jul 1 after a second null re-verification). Daily volume caps (50 L/day private, 200 L/day commercial) were introduced March 23 — the first EU country to cap motor-fuel purchases since the 1970s oil crisis. The decree was open-ended ("limits remain in place until authorities lift them" — Reuters via Newsweek); PM Golob framed the measure as demand-management against cross-border fuel tourism ("warehouses are full") rather than physical scarcity. GEF's 14-day burden-of-proof rule first demoted the pin to watch on Jun 22 when no June primary source could confirm the decree's status, then removed it on Jul 1 when a second re-verification pass again found nothing dated beyond March. Re-add if a fresh source confirms the decree is still active or a new shortage develops. The strategic reserve (~700M litres, ~103 days) and Petrol d.d. inquiry remain on file for historical reference.

Hungary · two-tier cap ABOLISHED 26 June — removed from the map. From 9 March Hungarian-registered vehicles paid capped prices of 595 HUF/L petrol and 615 HUF/L diesel while foreign plates paid market rate. Market prices fell below the cap by mid-June and the government abolished the regime on 26 June; all vehicles now pay market prices. This page continued to describe the cap as “phasing out” until 24 September, and that is corrected here.

Germany · PCK Schwedt feedstock cut, Day 152; gas storage ~57%. Russia's Deputy PM Novak confirmed on April 22 that transit of Kazakh crude through Druzhba's northern leg was suspended from May 1. Loss to PCK Schwedt: ~17% of crude throughput (~40,000–43,000 bpd). PCK supplies ~90% of Berlin–Brandenburg vehicle fuel plus jet fuel to Berlin's airports. No retail-pump shortage reports as of the last confirmed check; watch markers active (PCK utilisation, Berlin/Brandenburg pump availability, German strategic reserve drawdown). Germany's €0.14/L diesel excise cut (May 1 – June 30, €1.6bn fiscal cost) expired as scheduled on June 30 — a small pump-price adjustment took effect from July 1.

Ireland · Day 151 since protest pressure resurgent (watch). The April 7–14 fuel-protest cycle saw >500 forecourts run dry (Munster region most exposed), the Whitegate refinery (sole Irish refinery) blockaded, and a €505M government package with 10c/L excise cuts deployed to resolve the immediate crisis. Excise relief took effect midnight 14/15 April; Northern Ireland echo protests followed. As of May 25: no current station outages; pump availability normal. However, per Irish Times May 2, protest organisers at the "Breaking Point" rally explicitly signalled further action before the autumn budget. CEPA (April) characterises Ireland as the warning indicator for wider European road-fuel stress. Trigger conditions remain: high excise rates relative to disposable income (€2.08/L diesel through end-July), Whitegate refinery single-point-of-failure exposure, no EU-level flexibility yet granted on agri-diesel. Auto-promote to elevated on first credible blockade announcement.

Slovakia · easing signal May 8. Slovakia decided on May 6 to eliminate both the foreign-plate diesel surcharge AND the single-tank-per-vehicle restriction, effective May 8 (IndexBox May 9). Cross-border easing signal; with Hungary’s regime abolished on 26 June, no EU country now runs a two-tier pump regime. Transit drivers can refuel normally in Slovakia as of May 8. Other excise relief measures remain in force.

Austria · cross-border fuel-tourism corridor pressure. Pump prices ~€1.80/L are drawing Slovenian commercial drivers across the AT–SI border. Operationally this is distorting Austrian station throughput at border posts without breaking Austrian retail supply. Austria renewed its €0.50/L petrol+diesel excise reduction for May (IndexBox May 9). VIE Vienna airport jet fuel supply intact via the adjacent OMV Schwechat refinery; smaller AT airports (LNZ Linz, GRZ Graz) at higher physical-shortage risk in any continued tightening scenario.

The proximate cause is the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway between Iran and Oman through which approximately 20% of global oil and a similarly material share of refined-product trade historically transits. The strait has been effectively closed since February 28, 2026. Per the International Energy Agency's May 2026 Oil Market Report, cumulative global supply losses since February now exceed one billion barrels — the largest oil-supply disruption in IEA recorded history; IEA Director Fatih Birol at the G7 finance ministers meeting in Paris on May 18 told reporters commercial oil inventories are "depleting very fast," with cover now measured in "several weeks" not months.

Europe's structural exposure has three distinct layers. Refining capacity has been progressively consolidated over twenty years — major closures in Germany, France, Italy, the UK and the Netherlands have left the EU dependent on the ARA hub (Amsterdam–Rotterdam–Antwerp) for refined-product trading. The Druzhba pipeline disruption to PCK Schwedt is therefore not just a German problem; it removes regional balance from the Northern European product market. Crude supply historically came from a mix of North Sea, Russian (Urals), Middle East and West African sources; the Russian sanctions regime since 2022 layered onto the Hormuz closure since February has compressed supply diversity to a degree not seen since the 1970s. Strategic reserves at member-state level remain IEA-compliant (90-day minimum) — Europe's structural protection is materially better than Australia's — but the buffer that has been bridging the supply deficit is now depleting, per Birol's "several weeks" framing.

The retail-fuel intervention pattern that has emerged across SI / HU / IE / DE is consistent with the EU's federal structure: each member state retains taxation and consumer-protection sovereignty, so policy response has been national rather than continental. The European Commission has facilitated coordination (relaxed gas storage targets, joint LNG purchasing, ACER monitoring) but has not invoked emergency demand-management mechanisms. The cross-border distortions visible at HU–SK, HU–AT and AT–SI borders are the operational evidence that the patchwork is straining at the edges. The 2026 winter will test whether national-level intervention can hold without Commission-level emergency powers being invoked.

If you are driving in France, expect gaps at TotalEnergies stations in particular, where capped prices draw the most demand; on 21 September Paris (31.9% of stations short), Bas-Rhin and Indre-et-Loire were worst affected. Other networks have been far less affected but charge market prices, roughly 17–19 cents a litre more. Check a live station-availability map before a long route, and do not rely on a single planned stop.

If you are driving in Germany, retail supply is normal. The PCK Schwedt feedstock-cut watch zone is Berlin and Brandenburg; GEF has found no pump-shortage reports there. The €0.14/L diesel excise cut ran 1 May to 30 June and has expired.

If you are driving in Ireland, retail supply is normal. April’s outages were resolved by a €505M package and excise cuts, but organisers have signalled possible further action; Munster had the most acute April exposure, and the Whitegate refinery in Cork remains a single point of failure for Irish supply.

If you are driving across Hungary or Slovenia, neither now runs a special fuel regime that GEF can confirm: Hungary abolished its two-tier foreign-plate pricing on 26 June, and GEF removed Slovenia’s daily purchase caps from the map on 1 July after two re-verification passes found no evidence they remained in force. Confirm locally if in doubt.