About oil pipeline disruption tracking
This page tracks operational status of major international crude oil pipelines, with a focus on routes that have become critical to global supply since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz on February 28, 2026. The Jun 17 MoU that briefly reopened the strait has long since collapsed into renewed, repeated escalation; the current diplomatic track (an Iran-Oman route agreement, reported Aug 5) is the most concrete step toward reopening since, though not yet finalized or physically confirmed. Status categories follow the GEF threshold framework: offline / destroyed indicates a pipeline that is not transporting volumes; disrupted indicates reduced flow or repeated incidents; reduced indicates flowing below contracted or nameplate capacity; active indicates flowing within normal range. The map and incident list above are updated as operator filings, government statements and verified open-source incident reports arrive.
Saudi East-West Petroline (Petroline)
The 1,200km pipeline carrying Saudi Arabian crude from the eastern Abqaiq processing area across the kingdom to the Red Sea terminal at Yanbu — bypassing the Strait of Hormuz entirely. Petroline was the single most important Hormuz-bypass infrastructure globally during the closure period. The 7 mb/d nameplate capacity was fully restored within three days of the April 8 Iranian drone strike on a Petroline pumping station (Aramco confirmed full restoration Apr 12 per Bloomberg/Al Jazeera). The IEA's May 13 read showed Saudi raising Red Sea loadings by 900 kb/d month-on-month to 5.3 mb/d (4.2 mb/d crude) on higher Petroline throughput. Petroline is the key overland alternative to Hormuz and a single point of failure for the Gulf. Its strategic value has RISEN again since the 17 June memorandum expired on 17 August with no successor: the brief mid-year reopening that had let Saudi Arabia lean back on Ras Tanura has reversed, and strait transit now runs at roughly a tenth of the pre-war norm. The pipeline remains a high-value target.
Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP)
The 1.5 mb/d pipeline carrying UAE crude from the Habshan field complex to the Fujairah terminal on the Gulf of Oman — bypassing Hormuz on the UAE side. ADCOP was the second-largest Hormuz bypass route until the May 4, 2026 drone attack on the Fujairah Oil Industry Zone, which set fire to VTTI tank-farm facilities (jointly owned by Vitol, IFM and TAQA) and damaged the eastern terminus. The pipeline itself remained intact; subsequent UAE missile and drone barrages on May 5, 7 and 8 were intercepted by air defences. Throughput has been recovering and the IEA puts UAE total exports near 85% of pre-war. Specific repair status at the VTTI terminus has not been independently re-confirmed since May. Habshan (the gas-processing complex co-located at the ADCOP origin) was hit twice in March-April with one fatality from debris on Apr 3.
Druzhba (Friendship) Pipeline
The Soviet-era pipeline system carrying Russian and Kazakh crude into Central and Eastern Europe is technically a crude-oil pipeline rather than gas, but its disruption status affects European refining economics that downstream affect gas demand for power generation. The southern leg to Hungary and Slovakia restarted on April 22, 2026 (Day 53) after an 87-day outage following a Russian drone strike on the Ukrainian section in late January; the EU €90bn Ukraine loan was unblocked the same week. The northern leg supplying PCK Schwedt refinery in Brandenburg, Germany has been halted since May 1, 2026 (Day 135 today) after Russia confirmed it would stop transit of Kazakh crude through the route — PCK Schwedt has lost approximately 17% of its feedstock (~40,000-43,000 barrels per day), with diversification underway via Rostock, Gdansk and BTC. Berlin-Brandenburg retail fuel availability is on watch. Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic continue to receive volumes via the restored southern leg.
CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium)
The 1.4 mb/d pipeline carrying Kazakh crude from the Tengiz field across southern Russia to the Novorossiysk port terminal on the Black Sea. CPC carries approximately 80% of Kazakhstan's crude exports and approximately 1% of global oil supply. An April 6, 2026 Ukrainian drone attack damaged the Novorossiysk loading facilities — single-point mooring (SPM-2), berth and four storage tanks set on fire — reducing operational capacity to approximately 65%; Tengizchevroil declared force majeure on CPC Blend. A second Ukrainian drone attack hit the Novorossiysk terminal in the early hours of May 24, further straining capacity. KazTransOil reduced oil exports in May via two routes (PortSEurope Jun 14). Kazakh crude has redirected via BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) and other alternative routes, but full substitution at scale is not possible in the near term.
Russian refining (drone-strike track)
Ukraine's long-range drone campaign against Russian refineries has materially escalated through Q2 2026 and is now the single most important pipeline-adjacent crude-oil story alongside the Hormuz dynamics. The Gazprom Neft Moscow Oil Refinery in the Kapotnya district (~40% of the capital's gasoline supply, ~50% of its diesel) was struck on June 16 and again on June 18 in the largest drone attack on Moscow of the war (194+ drones intercepted that morning per Mayor Sobyanin; ~1,000 across Russia). Both primary refining units were disabled and the facility is unlikely to resume operations before 2027 per Reuters Jun 24. Strikes on central-Russia refineries (Kirishi, Ryazan, NORSI, YANOS, Syzran) have cut national gasoline output approximately 25% year-on-year, driving 56-region rationing, a 6.6% YTD pump-price rise, and Deputy PM Novak weighing a full diesel-export ban. Putin personally acknowledged the crisis on Sun Jun 28 and stood up a new task force. This is a Ukraine-war track, distinct from Hormuz.
Other monitored routes
The site tracks flow status of additional major routes including the East-Siberian-Pacific-Ocean (ESPO) pipeline carrying Russian crude to Asian markets, the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline through the Caucasus carrying Azerbaijani crude with ramping Kazakh re-routing (1.6M tonnes/yr 2026 up from 1.3M 2025), the Iraq-Turkey (Kirkuk-Ceyhan) pipeline which remains reduced from security incidents and the unresolved 2023 arbitration ruling, the Iran Goreh-Jask Hormuz bypass (operational at low throughput, feedstock constrained by South Pars damage), the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), the Keystone system and other North American infrastructure, and crude pipeline interconnections supporting the US Gulf Coast refining cluster. Atlantic Basin crude exports rose +3.5 mb/d since February toward East-of-Suez markets (US, Brazil, Canada, Kazakhstan, Venezuela leading) — that redirection should partly normalize as Gulf flow returns. The full disruption map and incident feed above reflect the current operational status of all monitored routes.
Why this matters
The pipeline picture remains dominated by the crisis, but the week to 26 August brought the first concrete diplomatic mechanism of the whole conflict: Iran and Oman have opened a phased framework for a temporary corridor — inbound through Iranian territorial waters, outbound through Iranian or Omani waters, with joint mine clearance planned and a 30–60 day window to negotiate a permanent route. Technical talks continue and no announcement date has been set (Windward MIOC, 27 Aug), so a framework exists rather than a corridor. A framework is not a transit, and GEF has not moved its chokepoint rating: Tehran says the strait will not fully reopen until Washington honours commitments under the lapsed June memorandum, and transit counts are unchanged. But the market has repriced hard, with crude down a fourth straight session to about $87 Brent after the “economic D-day” sanctions package landed softer than expected and spared the major Chinese banks. Saudi Petroline and ADCOP therefore retain their strategic-bypass role rather than losing it: with the 17 June memorandum expired since 17 August and transit at roughly a tenth of the pre-war norm, the overland routes are still carrying the risk premium. Bab el-Mandeb remains the more disrupted chokepoint, keeping the Suez reroute a live pressure valve. The structural paradox persists whichever way the diplomacy breaks: the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve fell a further 3.1 Mbbl to 286.6 Mbbl in the week to 28 August — its lowest since 26 November 1982, about 40.1% of authorised capacity and roughly 128.8 Mbbl below the pre-war baseline — even as commercial crude has built for three consecutive weeks to 424.4 Mbbl. Combined with the Russian refining track (roughly a quarter of national capacity lost to drone strikes in H1 2026, petrol exports banned to 31 January 2027) and Kazakhstan’s CPC terminal suspensions, the pipeline-side story remains one of supply-shock vulnerability sitting on top of structurally thin inventories.