Major monitored crude oil pipeline routes — flow status and disruptions
This page tracks operational status of major international crude oil pipelines, with a focus on routes that have become critical to global supply since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz on February 28, 2026. The strait has been reopening since the Jun 17 US-Iran MoU and the Jun 18 lifting of the US naval blockade — Persian Gulf exports are back to approximately 75% of pre-war and Brent settled $73.52 on Fri Jun 26, with the war premium fully unwound. Status categories follow the GEF threshold framework: offline / destroyed indicates a pipeline that is not transporting volumes; disrupted indicates reduced flow or repeated incidents; reduced indicates flowing below contracted or nameplate capacity; active indicates flowing within normal range. The map and incident list above are updated as operator filings, government statements and verified open-source incident reports arrive.
The 1,200km pipeline carrying Saudi Arabian crude from the eastern Abqaiq processing area across the kingdom to the Red Sea terminal at Yanbu — bypassing the Strait of Hormuz entirely. Petroline was the single most important Hormuz-bypass infrastructure globally during the closure period. The 7 mb/d nameplate capacity was fully restored within three days of the April 8 Iranian drone strike on a Petroline pumping station (Aramco confirmed full restoration Apr 12 per Bloomberg/Al Jazeera). The IEA's May 13 read showed Saudi raising Red Sea loadings by 900 kb/d month-on-month to 5.3 mb/d (4.2 mb/d crude) on higher Petroline throughput. With Hormuz now reopening, Saudi is loading Ras Tanura again and the bypass premium is fading — but Petroline remains the key overland alternative and a single-point-of-failure for any renewed Gulf disruption. The pipeline remains a high-value target.
The 1.5 mb/d pipeline carrying UAE crude from the Habshan field complex to the Fujairah terminal on the Gulf of Oman — bypassing Hormuz on the UAE side. ADCOP was the second-largest Hormuz bypass route until the May 4, 2026 drone attack on the Fujairah Oil Industry Zone, which set fire to VTTI tank-farm facilities (jointly owned by Vitol, IFM and TAQA) and damaged the eastern terminus. The pipeline itself remained intact; subsequent UAE missile and drone barrages on May 5, 7 and 8 were intercepted by air defences. Throughput has been recovering and the IEA puts UAE total exports near 85% of pre-war. Specific repair status at the VTTI terminus has not been independently re-confirmed since May. Habshan (the gas-processing complex co-located at the ADCOP origin) was hit twice in March-April with one fatality from debris on Apr 3.
The Soviet-era pipeline system carrying Russian and Kazakh crude into Central and Eastern Europe is technically a crude-oil pipeline rather than gas, but its disruption status affects European refining economics that downstream affect gas demand for power generation. The southern leg to Hungary and Slovakia restarted on April 22, 2026 (Day 53) after an 87-day outage following a Russian drone strike on the Ukrainian section in late January; the EU €90bn Ukraine loan was unblocked the same week. The northern leg supplying PCK Schwedt refinery in Brandenburg, Germany has been halted since May 1, 2026 (Day 89 today) after Russia confirmed it would stop transit of Kazakh crude through the route — PCK Schwedt has lost approximately 17% of its feedstock (~40,000-43,000 barrels per day), with diversification underway via Rostock, Gdansk and BTC. Berlin-Brandenburg retail fuel availability is on watch. Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic continue to receive volumes via the restored southern leg.
The 1.4 mb/d pipeline carrying Kazakh crude from the Tengiz field across southern Russia to the Novorossiysk port terminal on the Black Sea. CPC carries approximately 80% of Kazakhstan's crude exports and approximately 1% of global oil supply. An April 6, 2026 Ukrainian drone attack damaged the Novorossiysk loading facilities — single-point mooring (SPM-2), berth and four storage tanks set on fire — reducing operational capacity to approximately 65%; Tengizchevroil declared force majeure on CPC Blend. A second Ukrainian drone attack hit the Novorossiysk terminal in the early hours of May 24, further straining capacity. KazTransOil reduced oil exports in May via two routes (PortSEurope Jun 14). Kazakh crude has redirected via BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) and other alternative routes, but full substitution at scale is not possible in the near term.
Ukraine's long-range drone campaign against Russian refineries has materially escalated through Q2 2026 and is now the single most important pipeline-adjacent crude-oil story alongside the Hormuz dynamics. The Gazprom Neft Moscow Oil Refinery in the Kapotnya district (~40% of the capital's gasoline supply, ~50% of its diesel) was struck on June 16 and again on June 18 in the largest drone attack on Moscow of the war (194+ drones intercepted that morning per Mayor Sobyanin; ~1,000 across Russia). Both primary refining units were disabled and the facility is unlikely to resume operations before 2027 per Reuters Jun 24. Strikes on central-Russia refineries (Kirishi, Ryazan, NORSI, YANOS, Syzran) have cut national gasoline output approximately 25% year-on-year, driving 56-region rationing, a 6.6% YTD pump-price rise, and Deputy PM Novak weighing a full diesel-export ban. Putin personally acknowledged the crisis on Sun Jun 28 and stood up a new task force. This is a Ukraine-war track, distinct from Hormuz.
The site tracks flow status of additional major routes including the East-Siberian-Pacific-Ocean (ESPO) pipeline carrying Russian crude to Asian markets, the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline through the Caucasus carrying Azerbaijani crude with ramping Kazakh re-routing (1.6M tonnes/yr 2026 up from 1.3M 2025), the Iraq-Turkey (Kirkuk-Ceyhan) pipeline which remains reduced from security incidents and the unresolved 2023 arbitration ruling, the Iran Goreh-Jask Hormuz bypass (operational at low throughput, feedstock constrained by South Pars damage), the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), the Keystone system and other North American infrastructure, and crude pipeline interconnections supporting the US Gulf Coast refining cluster. Atlantic Basin crude exports rose +3.5 mb/d since February toward East-of-Suez markets (US, Brazil, Canada, Kazakhstan, Venezuela leading) — that redirection should partly normalize as Gulf flow returns. The full disruption map and incident feed above reflect the current operational status of all monitored routes.
The pipeline picture has fundamentally shifted since early June. Hormuz is reopening rather than closed: Saudi Petroline and ADCOP have moved from emergency-bypass mode to standby-strategic mode as Persian Gulf exports rebuild toward pre-war volumes. The war premium that drove Brent to $95 in early June has fully unwound — Brent settled $73.52 on Fri Jun 26, intraday low $71.94 (the lowest level since Feb 27, the war's start). The structural paradox of the moment: even as global crude oversupply concerns dominate price discovery, US domestic balances are at multi-decade tights — SPR at 1983 levels, Cushing at 2014 lows. Combined with the Russian refining track (Moscow Oil Refinery offline into 2027, 25% gasoline output drop, 56-region rationing), the pipeline-side story going forward is less about bypasses and more about the supply-shock vulnerability sitting on top of structurally thin inventories. For the broader supply-and-demand picture see the main dashboard and the weekly risk analysis briefing; for the consumer-side consequences see shortages.